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CYBERATTACKS ON MEDICAL DEVICES AND
HOSPITAL NETWORKS: LEGAL GAPS AND
REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
Katherine Booth Wellington†
America must also face the rapidly growing threat from
cyber-attacks. . . . We cannot look back years from now and
wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our
security and our economy.
—Barack Obama1
Abstract
Cyberattacks on medical devices and hospital networks are a
real and growing threat. Malicious actors have the capability to hack
pacemakers and insulin pumps, shut down hospital networks, and
steal personal health information. This Article analyzes the laws and
regulations that apply to cyberattacks on medical devices and
hospital networks and argues that the existing legal structure is
insufficient to prevent these attacks. While the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act and the Federal Anti-Tampering Act impose stiff penalties
for cyberattacks, it is often impossible to identify the actor behind a
cyberattack—greatly decreasing the deterrent power of these laws.
Few laws address the role of medical device manufacturers and
healthcare providers in protecting against cyberattacks. While
HIPAA incentivizes covered entities to protect personal health
information, HIPAA does not apply to most medical device
manufacturers or cover situations where malicious actors cause harm
without accessing personal health information. Recent FDA draft

† J.D., Harvard Law School (2013); B.A., Yale University (2008). The author is an
Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP, with a focus on healthcare and life sciences law. This paper
was written as part of the Petrie-Flom Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics Student
Fellowship. The author thanks Professor Benjamin Roin and Professor I. Glenn Cohen for
helpful comments and advice. The author also thanks Mikaela Ray and the rest of the editorial
staff of the journal. The statements and views expressed in this Article are those of the author,
do not reflect those of Ropes & Gray, and do not constitute legal advice or legal opinion.
1. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, State of the Union Address
(Feb. 12, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/02/12/transcriptobama-state-union-speech).
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guidance suggests that the agency has begun to impose cybersecurity
requirements on medical device manufacturers. However, this
guidance does not provide a detailed roadmap for medical device
cybersecurity and does not apply to healthcare providers. Tort law
may fill in the gaps, although it is unclear if traditional tort principles
apply to cyberattacks. New legal and regulatory approaches are
needed. One approach is industry self-regulation, which could lead
to the adoption of industry-wide cybersecurity standards and lay the
groundwork for future legal and regulatory reform. A second
approach is to develop a more forward-looking and flexible FDA
focus on evolving cybersecurity threats. A third approach is a
legislative solution. Expanding HIPAA to apply to medical device
manufacturers and to any cyberattack that causes patient harm is one
way to incentivize medical device manufactures and healthcare
providers to adopt cybersecurity measures. All three approaches
provide a starting point for considering solutions to twenty-first
century cybersecurity threats.
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INTRODUCTION
Cyberattacks against medical devices and hospital networks2 are
a real and growing threat. Iran’s nuclear facilities,3 Google’s servers,4
U.S. banks,5 and Persian Gulf oil and gas companies6 have all been
recent victims of cyberattacks. As described in Part I, medical
devices and hospital networks are just as vulnerable. Researchers
have demonstrated that it is possible to remotely hack implanted
insulin pumps and pacemakers—flooding the body with a deadly dose
of insulin or releasing a heart-stopping electric charge.7 Hospital
network security breaches have “disrupted glucose monitors, canceled
patient appointments and shut down sleep labs” in hospitals.8 Several
hospitals have experienced multi-day network outages due to malware
attacks.9 Medical identity theft—one goal of cyberattacks—is an
increasing problem faced by millions of patients each year.10
The existing legal structure is insufficient to address these

2. This Article focuses on the problem of cyberattacks on both medical devices and
hospital networks. It is unclear if a hospital network is a medical device. Commentators have
suggested that the FDA could regulate hospital networks as medical devices under the broad
definition of “devices” in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. The FDA may be moving in this
direction. See, e.g., Lucas Mearian, FDA Eyes Regulation of Wireless Networks at Clinics,
Hospitals,
COMPUTERWORLD
(Jan.
10,
2011,
6:01
AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9203761/FDA_eyes_regulation_of_wireless_networks
_at_clinics_hospitals?taxonomyId=132&pageNumber=1.
3. Iran Nuclear Facilities Hit by Cyber Attack that Plays AC/DC’s Thunderstruck at
Full Volume, MAIL ONLINE (July 25, 2012, 8:43 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2178781/Iran-nuclear-facilities-hit-cyber-attack-plays-AC-DCs-Thunderstruck-volume.html.
4. Nicole Perlroth, Google Warns of New State-Sponsored Cyberattack Targets, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012, 6:44 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/google-warns-newstate-sponsored-cyberattack-targets.
5. Lee Ferran, Iran Denies Cyber Attacks on US Banks, ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/iran-denies-cyber-attacks-us-banks/story?id=18191088.
6. Lolita C. Baldor, US: Hackers in Iran Responsible for Cyberattacks, NBC NEWS
(Oct. 12, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/us-hackers-iranresponsible-cyberattacks-1C6423908.
7. Christine Hsu, Many Popular Medical Devices May Be Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks,
MEDICAL
DAILY
(Apr.
10,
2012,
1:34
PM),
http://www.medicaldaily.com/news/20120410/9486/medical-implants-pacemaker-hackerscyber-attack-fda.htm.
8. Susan D. Hall, Hospital Medical Devices Riddled with Malware, FIERCEHEALTHIT
(Oct.
18,
2012),
http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/hospital-medical-devices-riddledmalware/2012-10-18.
9. Bat Blue KOs Malware in the First Round!, BAT BLUE NETWORKS,
http://www.batblue.com/page.php?55 (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
10. Taylor Armerding, Ransom, Implant Attack Highlight Need for Healthcare Security,
CSO (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.csoonline.com/article/725880/ransom-implant-attack-highlightneed-for-healthcare-security.
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threats. As described in Parts II and III, federal and state legal
regimes focus primarily on punishing the malicious actors behind
cyberattacks. However, these actors are extremely hard to identify
and often difficult to prosecute, undercutting the deterrence effects of
these regimes. While the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
the power to regulate the cybersecurity of medical devices and
hospital networks, it has only begun to do so through non-binding
draft guidance issued in 2013.11 The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) comes the closest to addressing
the problem of cyberattacks by requiring healthcare providers to
protect patient health information (PHI) on hospital networks.12
However, HIPAA does not apply to most medical device
manufacturers or address scenarios where a cyberattack does not
breach PHI.
Given the difficulty of identifying and deterring the malicious
actors behind cyberattacks, new approaches are needed to address the
threat of these attacks. Part IV describes three potential approaches.
The first approach is industry self-regulation, which could lead to the
adoption of industrywide cybersecurity standards and lay the
groundwork for future legal and regulatory reform. The second
approach is to shift the FDA’s focus from backward-looking adverse
event reporting to forward-looking identification of cybersecurity
risks. The regulation of aircraft safety by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) provides a model for a flexible approach to
addressing and mitigating new threats. The third approach is to adopt
a legislative solution to incentivize medical device manufacturers and
healthcare providers to adopt security features. Expanding HIPAA to
apply to medical device manufacturers and to any type of cyberattack
is one potential legislative solution.
This Article makes three contributions. First, it analyzes the
current legal framework that applies to cyberattacks on medical
devices and hospital networks. To date, there has not been an
overarching survey of this kind in the academic literature. Second, it
identifies gaps in the statutory and regulatory framework that make
11. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS
MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2013) [hereinafter CONTENT OF
PREMARKET
SUBMISSIONS],
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocu
ments/UCM356190.pdf.
12. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
FOR
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this framework insufficient to address the growing threat of
cyberattacks. Finally, it presents three different approaches to
addressing the threat of cyberattacks on medical devices and hospital
networks.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE THREAT

Cyberattacks may impact individual medical devices or entire
hospital networks. Security flaws may permit cyberattacks against
individual medical devices, potentially harming the patient relying on
the medical device. This could be the result of a malicious attack
against an individual patient or simply a computer virus that happens
to infiltrate the medical device. Security flaws may also lead to
cyberattacks against entire hospital networks, resulting in widespread
network outages and “impacting a hospital’s ability to treat patients or
relay critical information.”13 Security flaws may also permit the theft
of patient medical data contained either on medical devices or
hospital networks, “lead[ing] to fraudulent claims by the criminal
entity to the patient’s insurance company or . . . involv[ing] dishonest
pharmacists that wire fraudulent prescriptions that are eventually sold
on the black market.”14 All of these are serious threats to patient
safety and privacy.
There are three primary types of cyberattacks: unauthorized
access, malware, and a denial-of-service or distributed-denial-ofservice (DDoS) attack.15 Unauthorized access to a medical device
involves “a malicious actor intercepting and altering signals sent
wirelessly to the medical device.”16 Medical devices such as
pacemakers, neurostimulators, defibrillators, and drug pumps “use
embedded computers and radios to monitor chronic disorders and

13. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NAT’L CYBERSECURITY & COMMC’NS INTEGRATION
CTR., ATTACK SURFACE: HEALTHCARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR 3 (2012) [hereinafter
ATTACK SURFACE], available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-MedicalDevices.pdf.
14. Id. at 5.
15. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-816, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA
SHOULD EXPAND ITS CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF
DEVICES 15 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647767.pdf. “A ‘denial-ofservice’ attack is characterized by an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate users of
a service from using that service. Examples include attempts to ‘flood’ a network, thereby
preventing legitimate network traffic; attempts to disrupt connections between two machines,
thereby preventing access to service; attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a
service; [or] attempts to disrupt service to a specific system or person.” Denial of Service
Attacks,
CARNEGIE
MELLON
SOFTWARE
ENGINEERING
INSTITUTE,
http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/denial_of_service.html (last updated June 4, 2001).
16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 15.
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treat patients with automatic therapies.”17 These computers and
radios use electronic signals to communicate with devices outside of
the body, creating an opportunity for a malicious actor to intercept the
signals and disrupt the functioning of the medical device.18
Malware “is a malicious software program designed to carry out
annoying or harmful actions.”19 The susceptibility of a medical
device or hospital network to malware depends on the software
involved; some types of software are susceptible to malware, while
others are not.20 As medical device manufacturers and hospital
networks increasingly rely on off-the-shelf software, the threat of
malware increases.21 A DDoS attack often involves a computer worm
or virus that “overwhelm[s] a device by excessive communication
attempts, making the device unusable by either slowing or blocking
functionality or draining the device’s battery.”22 DDoS attacks may
also occur against hospital networks. All three types of attacks may
disrupt the functioning of the medical device or network, potentially
harming patients.
A. Cyberattacks on Individual Medical Devices
The Homeland episode aside,23 there have been no documented
incidents of a patient suffering harm from an attack on a medical
device. As one government panel discussion revealed, however,
medical devices in hospitals are “riddled” with malware, which can
“clog patient-monitoring equipment and other software systems, at
times rendering the devices temporarily inoperable.”24 According to
McAfee, a security company, “[m]edical devices, such as diagnostic
17. Daniel Halperin et al., Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software
Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses, 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SEC. & PRIVACY 129.
18. Id.
19. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 15.
20. See id.
21. See Martha Vockley, Safe and Secure? Healthcare in the Cyberworld, BIOMEDICAL
INSTRUMENTATION
&
TECH.,
May-June
2012,
at
165-66,
available
at
http://www.aami.org/publications/bit/2012/Healthcare_Cybersecurity_BIT_MayJune2012.pdf.
22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 15.
23. Tarun Wadhwa, Yes, You Can Hack a Pacemaker (and Other Medical Devices Too),
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2012, 8:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/singularity/2012/12/06/yes-youcan-hack-a-pacemaker-and-other-medical-devices-too (“On Sunday’s episode of the Emmy
award-winning show Homeland, the Vice President of the United States is assassinated by a
group of terrorists that have hacked into the pacemaker controlling his heart.”).
24. David Talbot, Computer Viruses are “Rampant” on Medical Devices in Hospitals,
MIT
TECHNOLOGY
REVIEW
(Oct.
17,
2012),
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/429616/computer-viruses-are-rampant-on-medicaldevices-in-hospitals.
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tablet computers, heart rate monitors, and MRI scanners, are just as
susceptible to malware as standard laptop computers.”25 At Boston’s
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, one study showed that 664
medical devices ran on outdated software.26 The hospital reported
taking one or two medical devices offline each week to remove
malware.27 While software updates are available to combat malware,
manufacturers may not permit hospitals to update the software on a
medical device because the manufacturer fears that doing so will
cause the device to lose FDA approval28—even though, according to
the FDA, this is not the case.29 Hospitals have described the
regulatory process to update software as “onerous.”30
While there are no reports of injuries to patients due to malware
on medical devices, there have been close calls. In one hospital,
“malware at one point slowed down fetal monitors used on women
with high-risk pregnancies being treated in intensive-care wards.”31
In another instance, the Conficker worm,32 a type of computer virus,
“caused problems with a Philips obstetrical care workstation, a GE
radiology workstation, and nuclear medical applications,” although no
one was apparently injured.33 It is likely only a matter of time before
malware causes harm to a patient in a critical situation.
Through several controlled experiments, researchers have shown
that unauthorized access and DDoS attacks against medical devices
are possible. In 2008, researchers gained remote access to one type of
defibrillator.34 The researchers conducted a “reprogramming attack,”
which “changes the operation of (and the information contained in)

25. Medical
Device
Security,
MCAFEE,
http://www.mcafee.com/us/industry/healthcare/medical-device-security.aspx (last visited Feb. 9,
2014).
26. See Talbot, supra note 24.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Reminder from FDA: Cybersecurity for Networked
Medical
Devices
is
a
Shared
Responsibility,
FDA
(Nov.
4,
2009),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm189111.htm
[hereinafter
Reminder from FDA].
30. Talbot, supra note 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See id.
32. The Conficker worm can disable Windows security features and download arbitrary
files. Help Protect Yourself from the Conficker Worm, MICROSOFT SAFETY AND SECURITY
CENTER, http://www.microsoft.com/security/pc-security/conficker.aspx#EWC (last visited Feb.
9, 2014).
33. Talbot, supra note 24.
34. Halperin, supra note 17, at 1.
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the defibrillator.”35 The researchers then altered when the device
administered electric shocks, gaining the ability to administer a shock
on command.36 The researchers also demonstrated that DDoS attacks
against the device were possible: “[A]n attacker can keep a
[defibrillator] in a state of elevated energy consumption” by making
the battery-operated defibrillator communicate indefinitely with an
outside device.37 Because DDoS attacks deplete battery life, this type
of attack could prevent a defibrillator from functioning when a patient
needs it.38
In 2010, another set of researchers demonstrated that they could
gain unauthorized remote access to an insulin pump from 100 feet
away.39 The researchers “(1) chang[ed] already-issued wireless pump
commands; (2) generat[ed] unauthorized wireless pump commands;
(3) remotely chang[ed] the software or setting on the device; and (4)
den[ied] communication with the pump device.”40 In other words, the
researchers gained the ability to instruct the insulin pump to flood the
body with insulin, potentially killing a person. The researchers also
found that a malicious actor could interrupt the communication
between the insulin pump and the patient’s insulin control unit,
preventing the patient from adding insulin to her bloodstream when
needed. The researchers noted similar security flaws with wireless
blood glucose monitors.41 Many insulin pump systems also use a
mobile phone to help patients monitor their glucose levels.42 A
malicious actor who breached the security of the mobile phone may
be able to use the phone to change the insulin pump’s settings.43
More recently, security researchers have demonstrated that it is
possible to hack an insulin pump from as far away as 300 feet away.44
Although previous experiments had required researchers to know the
pump ID of an insulin pump in order to hack it, the security
researcher Barnaby Jack created a device that could scan a room

35. Id.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Nathanael Paul et al., A Review of the Security of Insulin Pump Infusion Systems,
5
J.
OF
DIABETES
SCI.
&
TECH.
1557
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3262727.
40. Id. at 1559.
41. Id. at 1559-60.
42. Id. at 1560.
43. Id.
44. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 19.
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looking for insulin pump IDs. 45 Using this device, Jack was able to
identify the insulin pump ID of a volunteer and then cause the insulin
pump to dispense insulin—up to a deadly dose.46
It is difficult to know when—and if—a malicious actor will
exploit these vulnerabilities. According to security researcher David
Harley, “there are easier ways of committing mass murder than death
by pacemaker hacking, and there are certainly easier ways of
harvesting patient data than by hacking individual devices for the
meagre [sic] Patient Identifiable Data (PID) that may be embedded
there.”47 In contrast, security researcher Alexandru Balan notes that
“‘[a]n unspoken law of IT security is that any vulnerability will
eventually be exploited. . . . The scenarios that derive from this may
very well look like crime movies. Hackers can perform attempts at
patients’ lives, steal information about high profile public
figures . . . .’”48 Considering the rise in malware and DDoS attacks
against hospitals and the recent publicity over the relative ease of
hacking medical devices, it is likely only a matter of time before a
malicious actor conducts an attack against a personal medical device
like a pacemaker or insulin pump. New approaches are needed to
guard against these types of attacks.
B. Cyberattacks on Hospital Networks
In addition to disrupting the functioning of individual medical
devices, malware infections may impact an entire hospital network.49
Any network outage at a hospital can cause “chaos.”50 Malware can
shut down some or all of the computer systems in a hospital.
According to one security firm, “a multi-day malware outbreak” at a
45. Researcher Ups Ante on Hacking Medical Devices, INFOSEC ISLAND (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://isa.infosecisland.com/blogview/17785-Researcher-Ups-Ante-on-Hacking-MedicalDevices.html.
46. Id.
47. David Harley, Malware and Medical Devices: Hospitals Really Are Unhealthy
Places, WELIVESECURITY (Oct. 18, 2012, 3:19 AM), http://blog.eset.com/2012/10/18/malwareand-medical-devices-hospitals-really-are-unhealthy-places.
48. Bianca Stanescu, Heart Patients, Diabetics at Increasing Risk from Medical Device
Malware, HOTFORSECURITY (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.hotforsecurity.com/blog/heartpatients-diabetics-at-increasing-risk-from-medical-device-malware-4226.html.
49. ATTACK SURFACE, supra note 13, at 6.
50. Siobhan Chapman, Computer Outage Leaves Hospital in Chaos, COMPUTERWORLD
UK
(Nov.
28,
2008,
12:05
PM),
http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/itbusiness/12162/computer-outage-leaves-hospital-in-chaos; Bob Brewin, August VA Systems
Outage Crippled Western Hospitals, Clinics, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE (Oct. 5, 2007),
http://www.govexec.com/defense/2007/10/august-va-systems-outage-crippled-westernhospitals-clinics/25469.

BOOTH WELLINGTON

2014]

4/2/2014 10:58 PM

CYBERATTACKS ON MEDICAL DEVICES

149

New York City hospital shut down all of the hospital’s applications,
with “over 3 million malware compromise attempts per hour.”51
While the security firm was able to fix the problem within a day, a
day is a long time for a hospital to function without its computer
systems. Other hospitals have also suffered malware outbreaks.
According to a Veterans Administration report, “173 incidents of
security breaches of medical devices from 2009-2011 . . . disrupted
glucose monitors, canceled patient appointments and shut down sleep
labs.”52
DDoS attacks can also affect hospital networks. In 2002, the
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center’s entire computer system was
shut down by a “napster-like application that began exchanging
hundreds of gigabytes of data via multicast to multiple
collaborators.”53 It took the hospital two days to bring its computer
systems back online.54 In 2009, the FBI foiled the plans of twentysix-year-old hacker Jesse McGraw to use a hospital’s computer
network to launch a DDoS attack on a rival hacker group.55 Prior to
his arrest, McGraw had already “install[ed] malicious botnet code” on
hospital computers, “allowing him to remotely access the systems, in
preparation for launching . . . DDoS[] attacks.”56 McGraw had also
“impaired the integrity of some of the computer systems by removing
security features, e.g., uninstalling anti-virus programs, which made
the computer systems and related networks more vulnerable to
attack.”57 By gaining access to a computer controlling the heating
and ventilation for the hospital, McGraw “could have affected the
treatment and recovery of patients who were vulnerable to changes in
the environment. In addition, he could have affected treatment
regimes, including the efficacy of all temperature-sensitive drugs and

51. See Bat Blue KOs Malware in the First Round!, supra note 9.
52. Hall, supra note 8.
53. John D. Halamka, The CareGroup Network Outage, LIFE AS A HEALTHCARE CIO
(Mar. 4, 2008, 5:44 PM), http://geekdoctor.blogspot.com/2008/03/caregroup-networkoutage.html.
54. Id.
55. Mathew J. Schwartz, Hospital Hacker ‘GhostExodus’ Sentenced to 9 Years,
INFORMATIONWEEK
(Mar.
22,
2011,
11:27
AM),
http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/hospital-hacker-ghostexodus-sentencedto/229400039.
56. Id.
57. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist. of Tex., Former Security Guard Who
Hacked Into Hospital’s Computer System Sentenced to 110 Months in Federal Prison (Mar. 18,
2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/dallas/press-releases/2011/dl031811.htm.
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supplies.”58
Hospital network and medical device security are interrelated.
Medical devices with poor information security features can act as a
vector through which malware or DDoS attacks enter hospital
networks.
According to the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center, “[s]ince wireless [medical
devices] are now connected to Medical information technology (IT)
networks, IT networks are now remotely accessible through the
[medical device]. . . . [T]he communications security of [medical
devices] is now becoming a major concern.”59 Medical devices must
therefore have sufficient security features to prevent both tampering
with the medical device itself and using the medical device as an
entry point to spread malware or conduct a DDoS attack against a
hospital network.
C. Cyberattacks Leading to Theft of Medical Information
The theft of medical information contained on medical devices
and networks is a growing threat. Malware can steal medical
information from both medical devices and hospital networks.60
Because some medical devices such as insulin pumps wirelessly
broadcast patient information, malicious actors using specialized
equipment can access patient medical information from as far as 300
feet away.61 For example, an implanted defibrillator may broadcast
the patient’s name and diagnosis, in addition to the patient’s vital
signs.62 Malicious actors may also steal patient information directly
from hospitals.
Ninety-four percent of healthcare providers
experienced at least one data breach in 2011 or 2012.63 According to
a 2013 Ponemon Institute study, over 1.8 million Americans have
been affected by medical identity theft, costing on average $18,660
per victim.64 The total out-of-pocket cost of medical identity theft in

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
ATTACK SURFACE, supra note 13, at 2.
Id. at 5.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 19.
Halperin, supra note 17, at 2.
PONEMON INSTITUTE, THIRD ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON PATIENT PRIVACY &
DATA
SECURITY
1
(2012),
available
at
http://www2.idexpertscorp.com/assets/uploads/ponemon2012/Third_Annual_Study_on_Patient
_Privacy_FINAL.pdf.
64. PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2013 SURVEY ON MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT 4-5 (2013),
available
at
http://clearwatercompliance.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2013-MedicalIdentity-Theft-Report-FINAL.pdf.
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the United States is over $12 billion.65 Breaches of PHI almost
doubled from 2010 to 2011, and “525 breaches . . . involving 21.4
million individuals” occurred over a three-year period between 2009
and 2012.66
Medical identity theft can “lead[] to fraudulent claims by the
criminal entity to the patient’s insurance company or may even
involve dishonest pharmacists that wire fraudulent prescriptions that
are eventually sold on the black market.”67 One scheme involved
stealing the medical information of 7000 patients, encrypting it, and
then demanding a ransom to unencrypt the information so that
patients and doctors could access it.68 Missing or incorrect patient
health information can lead to an “improper diagnosis or therapy,”
which may result in harm or death due to “delayed or inappropriate
treatment.”69
Researchers have recently demonstrated that they could hack two
widely used medical management platforms that operate medical
devices.
From these platforms, researchers accessed patient
information in connected databases.70 By gaining access to the
medical management platform, researchers were also able to
theoretically operate any medical devices connected to the platform—
such as an X-ray machine.71 Given the growing threat of cyberattacks
against medical devices and hospital networks, new approaches are
needed to protect patients against attacks that could result in patient
harm or medical identity theft.
II. CURRENT LEGAL STRUCTURE
There are three legal regimes governing cyberattacks on medical
devices and hospital networks. First, federal statutes such as the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Federal Anti65. Id.
66. Armerding, supra note 10.
67. ATTACK SURFACE, supra note 13, at 5.
68. Armerding, supra note 10.
69. Stephen L. Grimes, Chairman, Medical Device Security Workgroup, Overview of
Medical Devices and HIPAA Security Compliance 9 (March 9, 2005), available at
http://www.shcta.com/ftp/Presentations/Overview%20of%20Medical%20Device%20Security%
20and%20HIPAA%20Compliance%20050228.pdf.
70. Darren Pauli, Patient Data Revealed in Medical Device Hack, SC MAGAZINE
AUSTRALIA (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.scmagazine.com/patient-data-revealed-inmedical-device-hack/article/276568.
71. John Leyden, Paging Dr. Evil: Philips Medical Device Control Kit ‘Easily Hacked,’
THE
REGISTER
(Jan.
18,
2013,
5:03
PM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/01/18/medical_device_control_kit_security.
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Tampering Act impose criminal liability on the malicious actors
behind cyberattacks. Second, federal regulatory regimes including
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and HIPAA
govern medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers.
HIPAA provides some protection against cyberattacks by creating a
regulatory framework to safeguard PHI. Under FDCA, the FDA has
begun to evaluate cybersecurity as a part of the medical device
approval process. However, the FDA has only recently issued draft
guidance in this area and has yet to develop a regulatory approach
designed to address rapidly evolving security threats. Finally, civil
common law and state criminal law impose liability on the malicious
actors behind cyberattacks and may also impose negligence liability
on medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers. As
discussed in Part III, these legal regimes are insufficient to address the
threat of cyberattacks because they focus on deterring the malicious
actors behind cyberattacks rather than on encouraging medical device
manufacturers and hospitals to improve medical device and hospital
network security.
A. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The CFAA72 punishes malicious actors who transmit code or
access protected computers, causing harm. This Act applies to
malicious actors who conduct cyberattacks against medical devices
and hospital networks.73 Despite its expansive reach, however, the
Act only criminalizes knowing and intentional acts.74 It does not
impose negligence liability on the developers or users of medical
devices or hospital networks with poor security features.75
Nevertheless, it is a powerful statute for prosecuting the malicious
actors behind cyberattacks.
The CFAA’s broad language criminalizes almost any knowing or
intentional cyberattack. Under the CFAA, “[w]hoever . . . knowingly

72. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
73. Id.
74. Id. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A)-(B).
75. See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495-96 (7th Cir. 2005) (“What protects
people who accidently erase songs on an iPod, trip over . . . a wireless base station, or rear-end a
car and set off a computerized airbag, is not judicial creativity but the requirements of the statute
itself: the damage must be intentional); Doe v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., No. CIV. 00100-M, 2001 WL 873063 (D.N.H. July 19, 2001) (noting that a plaintiff could only recover
under the CFAA against a defendant who violated the statute by accessing the plaintiff’s
“medical records without authority,” not against the hospital system whose records were
allegedly violated).
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causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes
damage without authorization, to a protected computer”76 is
punishable by “a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than
10 years, or both”77 for the first offense. If the actor “intentionally
accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result
of such conduct, recklessly causes damage,”78 the actor faces “a
fine . . . or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both” for a first
offense involving:
(I) [L]oss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year
period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value, (II) the
modification or impairment, or potential modification or
impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or
care of 1 or more individuals, (III) physical injury to any person;
79
[or] (IV) a threat to public health or safety.

This statutory language criminalizes cyberattacks that cause at least
$5,000 in harm, physically harm a patient, potentially modify or
impair patient diagnosis or treatment, or pose a threat to public health
or safety. As a result, even if a cyberattack on a medical device or
hospital network causes no physical harm or property damage, a
prosecutor may bring charges for “potential” impairment of patient
care or for posing a “threat” to public health or safety. Although
scholars have criticized the CFAA’s sweeping language under the
“void for vagueness” doctrine,80 most courts apply the statute.81
The CFAA only applies to acts involving “computers.”82 Under
the CFAA, “the term ‘computer’ means an electronic, magnetic,
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device
performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions.”83 Recent case
law makes clear that almost anything with a computer chip—such as
a digital medical device or hospital network—is a “computer.” In
United States v. Kramer, the Eighth Circuit stated that the definition

76. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
77. Id. § 1030(c)(4)(B).
78. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B) (emphasis added).
79. Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i).
80. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1581 (2010).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Mitra, 405 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2005). But see United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal.
2009).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
83. Id. § 1030(e)(1).
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of a computer in the CFAA “is exceedingly broad. . . . This definition
captures any device that makes use of a electronic data processor.”84
Applying this definition, the court found that a cell phone was a
computer.85 In United States v. Mitra, the Seventh Circuit noted that
“[s]ection 1030 is general. Exclusions show just how general.
Subsection (e)(1) carves out automatic typewriters, typesetters, and
handheld calculators; this shows that other devices with embedded
processors and software are covered. As more devices come to have
built-in intelligence, the effective scope of the statute grows.”86
Applying the expressio unius principle, the Mitra court held that a
radio is a “computer” because it contained a “computer chip.”87
Based on this case law, hospital networks are covered under the
CFAA because they utilize “electronic data processor[s]” and
“computer chips.” The Department of Justice (DOJ) manual on
computer crime supports this view. According to this manual, the
CFAA:
[P]rovides strong protection to the computer networks of hospitals,
clinics, and other medical facilities because of the importance of
those systems and the sensitivity of the data that they
contain. . . . The evidence only has to show that at least one
patient’s medical care was at least potentially affected as a
88
consequence of the intrusion.

The hacker Jesse McGraw was convicted under CFAA Sections
1030(a)(5)(A) and 1030(c)(4)(B)(i)(II) for accessing a hospital
network and “downloading a malicious code into a protected
computer without authorization” and was sentenced to nine years in
prison,89 similarly supporting an interpretation of “computer” that
applies to hospital networks.
Under this case law, many medical devices also fall under the
definition of “computer.” As long as a medical device has a computer

84. Kramer, 631 F.3d at 902-04.
85. Id. (finding that a cell phone was a computer under the broad definition of
“computer” under the CFAA even though “a ‘basic’ cell phone might not easily fit within the
colloquial definition of ‘computer’).
86. See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d at 495.
87. See id. at 493-94.
88. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, COMPUTER CRIME
AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION CRIMINAL DIV., PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 45 (2d
ed. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf.
89. United States v. McGraw, No. 3:09-CR-0210-B, 2012 WL 6004208 (N.D. Tex. Nov.
5, 2012); United States v. McGraw, No. 3:09-CR-0210-B, 2012 WL 6013258 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
3, 2012).
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chip or performs basic data processing functions, the CFAA applies.
Wireless or networked medical devices, for example, are “computers”
because they must perform data processing functions in order to
transmit electronic information.
Given the broad definition of “computer” under the CFAA,
supported by case law in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, there is
little question that a malicious actor would violate the CFAA by
conducting a cyberattack on a medical device or hospital network. If
the government can identify the malicious actor behind a cyberattack,
the CFAA’s expansive language and hefty penalties provide the
government with a powerful prosecutorial tool. However, as
discussed in Part III, it is very difficult to identify the malicious actors
behind cyberattacks. Thus while the CFAA may prescribe steep
penalties for conducting a cyberattack, it may not serve as a sufficient
deterrent against these attacks. For this reason, new approaches to
preventing cyberattacks are needed.
B. Federal Anti-Tampering Act
The Federal Anti-Tampering Act90 (Anti-Tampering Act)
criminalizes “tampering” with consumer products, including medical
devices. Similar to the CFAA, the Anti-Tampering Act’s steep
penalties make it a powerful tool for prosecutors. However, while the
Anti-Tampering Act likely applies to malicious actors who conduct
cyberattacks, it does not apply to medical device manufacturers or
hospitals that negligently fail to secure their devices or networks. In
addition, it is an open question whether the Anti-Tampering Act
applies to a cyberattack on a hospital network or to a cyberattack that
causes patient harm but does not itself affect the operation of a
medical device.
Because there have been no reported cyberattacks on medical
devices leading to patient harm, the Anti-Tampering Act has not
received much attention by courts or scholars in the context of
cyberattacks on medical devices or hospital networks.
The
government has prosecuted cyberattacks on hospital networks under
the CFAA, which provides for five- or ten-year sentences, depending
on whether the actor intentionally or recklessly caused damage.91 The
Anti-Tampering Act penalties are harsher, but they require tampering

90.
91.

18 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012).
See infra Part II.A.
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with a “consumer product.”92 A “consumer product” is defined as
“any ‘food,’ ‘drug,’ ‘device,’ or ‘cosmetic,’”93 which includes
medical devices94 but may not include hospital networks.
The Anti-Tampering Act does not define “tampering,” leaving
this term open to interpretation by the courts.95 While it is unclear
how courts will rule on this issue, it is likely that a cyberattack on a
medical device is “tampering.” In United States v. Garnett, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the conviction of a defendant under the AntiTampering Act for removing hydrocodone tablets from pill bottles
and “introducing other drugs into the bottles after scratching off their
identifying marks.”96 Even though “Garnett did not alter the
hydrocodone tablets themselves, his actions constitute tampering”
because “Garnett increased the risk that injury from incorrectly
dispensed drugs would occur.”97 The court relied on “§1365’s
purpose—increasing the penalty for willful wrongful conduct” in
reaching its conclusion.98 In United States v. Walton, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the conviction of a pacemaker vendor under the AntiTampering Act for changing the use-by dates of pacemakers and then
selling the out-of-date pacemakers to hospitals.99 The court found
that Walton’s conduct “falls quite clearly within the statutory
prohibitions.”100
Although most cases prosecuted under the Anti-Tampering Act
have involved defendants tampering with controlled substances in

92.

Under the Federal Anti-Tampering Act,
Whoever, with reckless disregard for the risk that another person will be placed
in danger of death or bodily injury and under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to such risk, tampers with any consumer product that affects
interstate or foreign commerce, or the labeling of, or container for, any such
product, or attempts to do so, shall—in the case of attempt, be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; if death of an individual
results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or
both; if serious bodily injury to any individual results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both; and in any other case, be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012).
93. Id. § 1365(h)(1)(A).
94. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012).
95. See United States v. Garnett, 122 F.3d 1016, 1018 (11th Cir. 1997).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Walton, 36 F.3d 32, 33 (7th Cir. 1994).
100. Id. at 35.
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medical syringes or pill bottles,101 the Anti-Tampering Act should
also apply to defendants who electronically tamper with medical
devices. A cyberattack against a medical device may include turning
off the device or altering the device’s function. Both actions would
risk injury to the patient by disrupting the treatment regime, which
under Garnett should constitute tampering. A malicious actor who
hacks into a patient’s medical device and then uses that device as a
way to access a hospital network (perhaps to conduct a DDoS attack
or to steal patient health information) could disrupt the device’s
function, slowing down its processing speed or affecting the ability of
the medical device to interface with the network. This conduct should
also constitute “tampering.”
Even if a malicious actor does not alter the medical device
itself—just as the defendant did not alter the hydrocodone tablets in
Garnett—a cyberattack may fall under the Anti-Tampering Act if the
defendant’s access to the medical device could potentially harm
patients. For example, a malicious actor could use a medical device
as an access point to disrupt a hospital network, leaving the medical
device intact but potentially harming other hospital patients relying on
the hospital network. Under Garnett, this could fall under the AntiTampering Act’s purpose to penalize “willful wrongful conduct.” It
is unclear how a court would come out on this issue.
It is similarly unclear whether the Anti-Tampering Act
criminalizes the disruption of a hospital network rather than the
disruption of a medical device. The Anti-Tampering Act defines
“consumer products” broadly to include “devices,” and thus if a
hospital network is a device, it likely qualifies. However, it is unclear
if a hospital network is a medical device.102 Even if a hospital
network is not itself a “device,” hospitals routinely connect medical
devices to their networks. If a malicious code shuts down a hospital
network, and therefore prevents a connected medical device from
functioning properly, it is possible that the Anti-Tampering Act
applies. A court looking to the purpose of this Act under Garnett
might find liability, whereas a court more strictly construing
“tampering” might not find liability where the effect on a medical
device is one step removed from the defendant’s actions. A court
could look to the foreseeability of the harm to a medical device to

101. See, e.g., United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2006); Jane W. v.
President & Directors of Georgetown College, 863 A.2d 821 (D.C. 2004); United States v.
Garnett, 122 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1997).
102. See Mearian, supra note 2.
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help determine liability under this Act.
While the Anti-Tampering Act may be somewhat redundant with
the CFAA, and prosecutors may be more comfortable prosecuting
malicious actors for computer-related crimes under the CFAA, the
Anti-Tampering Act may serve as an additional source of criminal
liability for cyberattacks. The harsher penalties of the AntiTampering Act may appeal to prosecutors, especially in cases where
actors have directly hacked medical devices rather than hospital
networks and the provisions of the Anti-Tampering Act more clearly
apply. However, this Act does not impose penalties on medical
device manufacturers or hospitals that do not adopt measures to
prevent “tampering” with these devices or networks. For this reason,
the Act may ultimately do little to deter cyberattacks.
C. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
HIPAA regulates the privacy and security of PHI such as patient
names, diagnoses, and the serial numbers of medical devices.103
Accordingly, HIPAA plays a central role in medical device
cybersecurity. HIPAA does not, however, address some of the central
issues posed by the threat of cyberattacks on medical devices and
hospital networks. Because HIPAA focuses on the security of PHI, it
does not address cyberattacks that disrupt devices or networks but do
not involve a breach of PHI. HIPAA also does not apply to most
medical device manufacturers. As a result, HIPAA incentivizes
hospitals to adopt more secure networks—at least where PHI is
involved—but does little to incentivize medical device manufacturers
to adopt security features. Despite its underinclusiveness, HIPAA’s
strict liability scheme provides an example of one approach to
protecting against cyberattacks.
HIPAA imposes significant responsibilities on healthcare
providers to protect against unauthorized disclosure of PHI, levying
large fines on providers who suffer breaches of PHI as a result of theft
or accident. HIPAA has two main parts: the Privacy Rule and the
Security Rule. The Privacy Rule “establishes national standards to
protect individuals’ medical records and other personal health
information” and “requires appropriate safeguards to protect the
privacy of personal health information.”104 The Security Rule
103. Id.
104. The Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/index.html (last visited Feb. 9,
2014).
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“requires appropriate administrative, physician and technical
safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and security of
electronic protected health information.”105
HIPAA only applies to “covered entities.” These include
hospitals and other healthcare providers, but do not include medical
device manufacturers unless they “sell to patients and bill
Medicare.”106 Some medical device manufacturers, such as insulin
pump manufacturers, are covered entities because they sell directly to
Medicare patients.107 Most, however, are not. HIPAA’s criminal
provisions apply to covered entities and certain employees of covered
entities, but not to individuals unassociated with the covered entity.108
Regulations promulgated under the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act109 (HITECH Act)
impose harsh penalties for HIPAA violations and require covered
entities to notify patients of a PHI breach. The HITECH Act
enforcement rule provides penalties for four different violation
categories: “Did Not Know,” “Reasonable Cause,” “Willful
Neglect—Corrected,” and “Willful Neglect—Not Corrected.” The
penalties range from $100 to $50,000 for each violation in the first
category and are $50,000 for each violation in the fourth category.
“Violations of an identical provision in a calendar year” are capped at
$1.5 million.110 The HITECH Act requires covered entities to
“promptly notify affected individuals of a breach, as well as the U.S.
Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary and the media in cases

105. The Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS,,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/index.html (last visited Feb. 9,
2014).
106. Privacy Basics: A Quick HIPAA Check for Medical Device Companies, MEDICAL
DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.mddionline.com/article/privacybasics-quick-hipaa-check-medical-device-companies.
107. See id.
108. But see Alabama Woman Sentenced to Prison for Patient Identifications at Hospital,
PRIVATE
OFFICER
NEWS
NETWORK
(Feb.
3,
2012),
http://privateofficernews.wordpress.com/tag/chelsea-catherine-stewart (noting that a woman
unassociated with a hospital was sentenced to three years in prison under a HIPAA criminal
provision for “stealing identifying information on more than 4,000 patients from a Birmingham
hospital”); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist. of Ala., Alabaster Woman Indicted
for Stealing Hospital Patient Information (June 28, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/aln/News/June%202011/June%2028,%202011%20Alabaster
%20Woman.html.
109. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300jj, 17931-40 (2013).
110. HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 74 Fed. Reg. 56127 (proposed
Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/enforcementrule/enfifr.pdf.
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where a breach affects more than 500 individuals.”111 The DOJ has
the power to bring criminal cases against covered entities that
“knowingly” violate HIPAA,112 although it rarely does so.113 A
criminal conviction could result in steep fines114 and exclusion from
Medicare, a serious penalty.115
The consequences of a HIPAA breach are severe, even when the
breach is accidental or the result of theft. For example, the Alaska
Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) paid $1.7 million
in a settlement with HHS after a USB drive containing the health
information of 2000 patients was stolen.116 A HHS investigation
determined that “DHSS had not completed a risk analysis,
implemented sufficient risk management measures, completed
security training for its workforce members, implemented device and
media controls, or addressed device and media encryption as required
by the HIPAA Security Rule.”117 Phoenix Cardiac Surgery, a
physician practice, paid $100,000 in a settlement with HHS after an
Office of Civil Rights investigation determined “that the physician

111. HITECH Breach Notification Interim Final Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/breachnotificationifr.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2014); see also Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health
Information, 74 Fed. Reg. 42740 (Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-08-24/pdf/E9-20169.pdf.
112. Under Section 1320d-6, HIPAA criminalizes “knowingly and in violation of this
part—(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier; (2) obtains individually
identifiable health information relating to an individual; or discloses individually identifiable
health information to another person.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2012).
113. See DOJ Steps Up Enforcement with Indictment of ‘Loose Lips’ Doctor, Hospital
Visitor, HEALTH BUSINESS DAILY (July 15, 2011), http://aishealth.com/archive/hipaa0711-01
(noting that DOJ “had prosecuted only a dozen or so criminal HIPAA violations in eight years”
and describing two additional cases); The HIPAA Medical Privacy Law: The Current State of
Criminal
Enforcement,
KAISER
LAW
FIRM,
PLLC
(May
23,
2012),
http://kaiserfirm.com/lawyer/2012/05/23/Health_Care_Fraud/The_HIPAA_Medical_Privacy_La
w__The_Current_State_of_Criminal_Enforcement_bl4229.htm.
114. The penalty for violation is a fine of up to $50,000, a one-year term of imprisonment
or both. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b)(1). “[I]f the offense is committed under false pretenses,” the
fine is “not more than $100,000,” imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both. Id. § 1320d-6(b)(2).
“[I]f the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health
information for commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm,” the violator may “be
fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.” Id. § 1320d6(b)(3).
115. Id. § 1320d-6(b)(3).
116. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Alaska Settles HIPAA Security Case
for
$1,700,000
(June
26,
2012),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/06/20120626a.html.
117. Id.
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practice was posting clinical and surgical appointments for its patients
on an Internet-based calendar that was publically accessible.”118
Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary (MEEI) agreed to a $1.5 million
settlement with HHS after “an unencrypted personal laptop containing
the electronic protected health information (ePHI) of MEEI patients
and research subjects was reported stolen.”119
HHS has begun prosecuting small-scale breaches of PHI. In
June of 2010, a laptop containing the PHI of fewer than 500 patients
was stolen from the Hospice of North Idaho (HONI).120 HONI “had
not conducted a risk analysis to safeguard []PHI” and “did not have in
place policies or procedures to address mobile security as required by
the HIPAA Security Rule.”121 In January of 2013, the hospice agreed
to a $50,000 settlement with HHS.122 The HONI case demonstrates
that covered entities must protect against even small-scale loss or
theft of PHI.
While HIPAA provides for significant penalties for PHI
breaches, HIPAA does not adequately address the threat of
cyberattacks. HIPAA is focused on protecting patient health
information—not patient health. HIPAA does not incentivize
hospitals to adopt security measures to protect against cyberattacks
that do not involve PHI. It is possible that a malicious actor could
conduct a cyberattack against a medical device or hospital network
without accessing PHI and thus never run afoul of HIPAA. HIPAA
also does not apply to most medical device manufacturers. Increased
HIPAA prosecution of medical device manufacturers’ customers,
such as hospitals, will likely put pressure on medical device
manufacturers to take information security risks into account when
designing devices. Nevertheless, HIPAA fails to create a direct
incentive for medical device manufacturers to adopt improved
security measures. While HIPAA is a step in the right direction, it
does not provide sufficient protection against the threat of
cyberattacks.

118. Id.
119. Erin McCann, Massachusetts Group to Pay $1.5M HIPAA Settlement, HEALTHCARE
IT NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/massachusetts-group-pay15m-hipaa-settlement.
120. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Announces First HIPAA
Breach Settlement Involving Less than 500 Patients: Hospice of North Idaho Settles HIPAA
Security
Case
for
$50,000
(Jan.
2,
2013),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/01/20130102a.html.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Although HIPAA is not designed to address all types of
cyberattacks, it provides a regulatory model for combatting
cybercrime. HIPAA focuses on the entities subject to attack, not the
attackers. Such an approach is needed in the realm of cybercrime,
where the attacker may be difficult or impossible to identify.123
HIPAA’s sliding scale liability scheme—including strict liability for
data breaches where the covered entity “Did Not Know” and was not
at fault—incentivizes covered entities to determine the best way to
protect PHI. This type of approach makes sense where government
regulators may not be able to respond quickly to new security risks.
HIPAA’s strict liability scheme permits the government to prosecute
(or negotiate settlements) with covered entities in an area where the
common law negligence standard of care is unclear. Until courts
grapple with more cyberattack cases, the standard of care for
protecting medical device and hospital networks against cyberattacks
will likely remain unclear—providing a rationale for adopting this
type of approach. Although HIPAA has its flaws, the Act addresses
some of the weaknesses of a traditional regulatory scheme that is
unable to respond quickly and flexibly to changing threats. While
HIPAA itself does not provide sufficient protection against
cyberattacks, it does provide a model for regulating security risks in a
digital world. As described in Part IV, Congress could expand
HIPAA to more fully address the risk of cyberattacks against medical
devices and hospital networks.
D. Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
Although the FDA issued draft guidance on medical device
cybersecurity in June of 2013,124 the agency has yet to develop a
forward-looking regulatory approach that addresses new cyberattack
threats. The FDA has many different regulatory tools—including the
premarket notification and approval processes and the postmarket
review process—that could help ensure that medical device
manufacturers and hospitals take precautions against cyberattacks.
The FDA has also asserted its authority over mobile medical
applications (MMAs) and medical device data systems (MDDSs),
allowing the FDA to regulate medical device software and
information storage systems. Until recently, the FDA has not used
these tools to ensure that medical devices protect patients from the

123.
124.

See infra Part III.A.
See CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 11.
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threat of cyberattacks in part because the FDA “did not consider
information security risks from intentional threats as a realistic
possibility . . . .”125 The FDA’s challenge, as described in Parts III
and IV, is to recalibrate its regulatory structure to address the rapidly
evolving threat of cyberattacks.
1. Overview of FDA Regulation
a. Premarket Notification and Approval
While the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)126 and
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)127 play a role
in medical device regulation, the FDA is the primary regulator of
medical devices. The FDA’s power to regulate “medical devices” is
very broad and includes regulation of medical devices, components
and accessories of medical devices, MMAs, MDDSs, and likely
hospital networks128 that interface with medical devices.129 Under this
expansive definition of “medical devices,” the FDA has extended its
regulatory authority to new types of devices, from smartphones that

125. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 1.
126. The FCC has regulatory authority over “various media and communication
technologies, including the allocation of frequencies and the specification of technical
requirements to ensure the security and reliability of wirelines, broadband, and wireless
communication devices.” Vernessa T. Pollard & Chandra Branham, FDA Medical Device
Requirements: A Legal Framework for Regulating Health Information Technology, Software,
and Mobile Apps, RECENT DEV. IN FOOD & DRUG LAW 2011, 2011 WL 5833341, at *9. FCC
has agreed to partner with FDA to “develop a coordinated regulatory approach for wirelessenabled medical devices, mobile apps, and other health IT.” Id.; see Margaret A. Hamburg,
Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at the FDA/FCC Public Workshop: Enabling the
Convergence of Communications and Medical Systems (July 26, 2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm220447.htm.
127. CMS is not “being as active from an enforcement standpoint with respect to health IT
products.” Vernessa T. Pollard & Chandra Branham, FDA Medical Device Requirements: A
Legal Framework for Regulating Health Information Technology, Software, and Mobile Apps,
RECENT DEV. IN FOOD & DRUG LAW 2011, 2011 WL 5833341, at *9. However, CMS could
play a much greater role in determining which medical devices and mobile applications to
reimburse under federal programs like Medicare. Id.
128. Mearian, supra note 2.
129. Under the FDCA,
The term ‘device’ . . . means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant in vitro reagent, or similar or related article, including any
component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for the use in the diagnosis
of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease . . . or . . . intended to affect the structure or other function of the
body . . . and which does not achieve its primary intended purpose through
[chemical or metabolic action].
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012).
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allow doctors to view ultrasound images130 to software “intended for
use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions.”131
Under the Medical Device Amendments Act of 1976 (MDAA),
there are three regulatory classifications for medical devices.132
“Class I devices are typically simple in design, manufacture and have
a history of safe use,” such as “tongue depressors, arm slings, and
hand-held surgical instruments.”133 These devices are unlikely to
have wireless connections or otherwise be subject to cyberattacks,
although as discussed below, medical device data systems are now
Class I devices. A device falls under Class II if there are more
concerns about its “safety and effectiveness.”134 Examples of these
types of devices are insulin pumps,135 “physiologic monitors, x-ray
systems, [and] gas analyzers.”136 The majority of wireless medial
devices are Class II devices.137 Class III medical devices are those
devices that are “life-supporting or life-sustaining, or for a use which
is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health, or if the device presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness
or injury.”138 This includes devices like cardiac defibrillators.139
There are three different levels of regulatory review of medical

130. See Scott Jung, Mobisante’s MobiUS Smartphone Ultrasound Receives FDA 510(k)
Clearance,
MEDGADGET
(Feb.
7,
2011,
1:58
PM),
http://www.medgadget.com/2011/02/mobisantes_mobius_smartphone_ultrasound_receives_fda
_510k_clearance.html.
131. Scott D. Danzis & Christopher Pruitt, Rethinking the FDA’s Regulation of Mobile
Medical Apps, 9 THE SCITECH LAWYER, no. 3, 2013, available at
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/56c8d97e-4432-4623-b81c1230545cc204/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cb8b13fe-9b8f-4de4-b8d315096d3b25be/Rethinking_the_FDA’s_Regulation_of_Mobile_Medical_Apps.pdf.
132. Medical Device Amendments Act of 1976, 21 U.S.C.A. § 360c (West 2014).
133. 2008-04 FDA Device Classification, LEEDERGROUP [hereinafter FDA Device
Classification], http://leedergroup.com/bulletins/fda-device-classification (last visited Feb. 9,
2014).
134. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012title21-vol8/pdf/CFR-2012-title21-vol8-sec860-3.pdf.
135. Id.
§
880.5725
(2014),
available
at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/cfrsearch.cfm?fr=880.5725.
136. FDA Device Classification, supra note 133.
137. Wireless Medical Technologies: Navigating Government Regulation in the New
Medical
Age,
FISH
&
RICHARDSON,
at
6,
http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/attachments/FinalRegulatoryWhitePaperWirelessMedical
Technologies.pdf (last updated Nov. 2013).
138. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012title21-vol8/pdf/CFR-2012-title21-vol8-sec860-3.pdf.
139. 21
C.F.R.
§
870.5310
(2013),
available
at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?fr=870.5310.
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devices: Premarket approval (PMA), 510(k) premarket notification,
and quality controls. The highest level of review is the lengthy and
expensive PMA process, which “demands extensive and meticulous
documentation to demonstrate safety and effectiveness.”140 If PMA is
not required, all medical devices must undergo 510(k) review unless
the device is exempt from premarket notification.141 “A 510(k) is a
premarket submission made to the FDA to demonstrate that the
device to be marketed is at least as safe and effective, that is,
substantially equivalent” to a device already on the market when the
MDAA was passed in 1976.142 The 510(k) process is roughly three
times faster and fifty times cheaper than the PMA process.143
Manufacturers of devices that are subject to FDA regulation but do
not require PMA or 510(k) review still “need to adopt a quality
system, register and list with the FDA, and report adverse events
associated with their product.”144
Some devices—primarily Class I devices—are only subject to
quality controls.145 Most Class II devices and three-fourths of Class
III devices receive 510(k) treatment, while the remaining Class III
devices undergo PMA review.146 The MDAA originally envisioned
that all new medical devices would undergo PMA review. However,
because PMA review is so lengthy and expensive, manufacturers
attempt to demonstrate that new Class III devices are “substantially
equivalent” to devices that were on the market in 1976 and thus
subject to only 510(k) review. The FDA clears 99% of devices
subject to premarket approval or notification under the 510(k) process
and only 1% under the PMA process.147 The 510(k) premarket
notification process is therefore the primary process through which
medical devices with wireless or network capabilities reach the

140. Adam Lewin, Medical Device Innovation in America: Tensions Between Food and
Drug Law and Patent Law, 26 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 403, 408-09 (2012), available at
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v26/26HarvJLTech403.pdf.
141. Premarket
Notification
(510k),
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/prem
arketsubmissions/premarketnotification510k/default.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
142. Id.; see Lewin, supra note 140, at 409.
143. Lewin, supra note 140, at 409.
144. Brian Dolan, Understanding FDA’s New MDDS Rule, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Feb. 15,
2011), http://mobihealthnews.com/10234/understanding-fdas-new-mdds-rule.
145. See Overview of Medical Devices and Their Regulatory Pathways, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/C
DRHTransparency/ucm203018.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
146. Lewin, supra note 140, at 409.
147. Id.
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market.
Despite the extensive testing that goes into the PMA process,
prior to 2013, the “FDA ha[d] not begun to consider risks resulting
from intentional threats,”148 such as cyberattacks.
While
manufacturers of Class II and Class III devices had to conduct
“software validation and risk analysis” in order to receive FDA
approval,149 the FDA did not require analysis of vulnerability to
cyberattacks. A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
analysis of the 2001 and 2006 PMA supplements for two medical
devices with known security risks noted that the “FDA did not
demonstrate that it had considered the potential benefits of mitigation
strategies to protect devices against information security risks from
certain unintentional or intentional threats in light of the appropriate
level of acceptable risk for medical devices with known
vulnerabilities.”150 In the 2012 PMA for a defibrillator, the FDA did
consider information security threats. However, it only considered
unintentional threats.151 Additionally, the FDA did not engage in
extensive testing of devices against specific threats, such as “testing
of attempts to enter incorrect or invalid data in the device or the use of
fuzzing, an information security-related testing technique that uses
random data to discover software errors and security flaws.”152
Following the GAO report, the FDA released draft guidance on
medical device and hospital network cybersecurity in June 2013.153
Although the guidance applies to both PMA and 510(k)
submissions,154 it is not binding.155 At five pages in length, the
guidance document lays out basic principles rather than specific
recommendations.
Echoing HIPAA, the document states that
“[m]anufacturers should develop a set of security controls to assure
medical device cybersecurity to maintain information confidentiality,
integrity, and availability.”156 The document advises manufacturers to

148. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 25.
149. 21
C.F.R.
§
820.30(g)
(West
2014),
available
at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/cfrsearch.cfm?fr=820.30.
150. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 24-25.
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id.
153. See CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 2.
156. Compare id. at 2, with 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) (2013) (“Risk analysis
(Required). Conduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and
vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health
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“consider cybersecurity during the design phase of the medical
device.”157 The document also recommends basic security features,
such as user authentication and restriction of updates to authenticated
code.158 Although these recommendations are important because they
signal a new focus on cybersecurity by the agency, they provide only
a basic overview of cybersecurity considerations.159
The draft guidance is not, however, without teeth. FDA
regulations already require manufacturers to conduct a “risk analysis”
of medical device software to obtain FDA approval. The draft
guidance expands the meaning of “risk” to include both unintentional
and intentional security threats: “Manufacturers should define and
document . . . their cybersecurity risk analysis and management plan
as part of the risk analysis required by 21 CFR 820.30(g).”160 This
statement suggests that the FDA may exercise its authority under
existing regulations to reject devices that are vulnerable to intentional
cyberattacks even before the agency promulgates new rules
addressing intentional security threats.
The FDA has refused to accept a 510(k) application for review
because the application failed to address the new draft guidance.161
Although at least one commentator has suggested that it was unlawful
for the FDA to act on the basis of draft guidance,162 the FDA has a
strong argument that the phrase “risk analysis” is broad enough to
include analysis of both intentional and unintentional threats. Under
this view, the “draft” guidance is in part a statement of how the FDA
will interpret existing regulations rather than merely a set of
recommendations for manufacturers. Device manufacturers will
likely take the draft guidance seriously going forward, although the
FDA may face an administrative law challenge to its authority to
regulate under this guidance.
information . . . .”),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2007-title45vol1/pdf/CFR-2007-title45-vol1-sec164-308.pdf.
157. See CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124, at 3.
158. See id. at 4.
159. See Erik Vollebregt, FDA’s Draft Guidance on Cybersecurity: Nothing Exciting but
Useful
Examples,
MEDICALDEVICESLEGAL
(June
17,
2013),
http://medicaldeviceslegal.com/2013/06/17/fdas-draft-guidance-on-cybersecurity-nothingexciting-but-useful-examples.
160. Id.
161. See Allyson B. Mullen, Premature Enforcement of CDRH’s Draft Cybersecurity
Guidance,
FDA
LAW
BLOG
(Sept.
12,
2013),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/09/premature-enforcement-ofcdrhs-draft-cybersecurity-guidance.html.
162. See id.
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The FDA’s refusal to accept a 510(k) application that does not
comply with its draft guidance on cybersecurity demonstrates the
need to recalibrate the device classification and approval process to
better address cybersecurity concerns. Most new devices are cleared
through the 510(k) process. The 510(k) process, however, is
primarily concerned with demonstrating the substantial equivalence
of a new device to an existing device—not with the inherent safety or
effectiveness of the new device.163 The 510(k) pathway appears
especially ill-suited to evaluating medical devices with network
capabilities. A medical device that was safe in 1976 may no longer
be safe once it has the capability to connect to a hospital network or
broadcast a wireless signal.
The FDA has addressed weaknesses in the 510(k) approval
process through policy and guidance documents. One commentator
notes that “as FDA issues more and more policies and guidance
documents, the standard for 510(k) clearance seems to move further
from being equivalent to a device currently on the market to meeting
FDA’s new heightened standards. . . .”164 From a cybersecurity
perspective, draft guidance from the FDA is better than no guidance.
From an administrative law perspective, however, the FDA may be
vulnerable to legal challenges if it tries to aggressively enforce its
guidance documents. To stay within the bounds of its regulatory
authority, the FDA may be forced to issue less aggressive guidance
and policy documents and hope industry will comply.165 This may
prevent the FDA from taking a strong stance on cybersecurity.166 It
may also create uncertainty for medical device manufacturers.167
Many commentators have suggested that the 510(k) process is
163. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE
FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 2 (2011), available at
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Medical-Devices-and-the-PublicsHealth-The-FDA-510k-Clearance-Process-at-35Years/510k%20Clearance%20Process%202011%20Report%20Brief.pdf (“When the FDA
assesses the substantial equivalence of a device, it generally does not require evidence of safety
or effectiveness; and when a device is found to be substantially equivalent to a predicate device,
the new device is assumed to be as safe and effective as the predicate because of its similarity.”).
164. See Mullen, supra note 161.
165. See generally K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
507, 538 (2011) (“FDA currently produces roughly twice as many guidance documents per year
as legislative rules, and statistics suggest its annual output of guidance has increased
regularly.”).
166. See id. (“[T]o the extent FDA relies on guidance as its primary mode of
policymaking, it may find it increasingly difficult to win victories in court.”).
167. See id. (“The Supreme Court has offered little further guidance regarding the level of
deference that informal FDA documents warrant.”).
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flawed,168 and the poor fit between the 510(k) process and
cybersecurity concerns is one more reason for Congress to revisit the
medical device approval process.
b. Post-Market Review
The FDA uses three primary methods of post-market regulation
of medical devices: adverse event reporting, postapproval studies, and
postapproval reports. The FDA uses the Manufacturer and User
Facility Device Experience Database (MAUDE) to monitor adverse
events involving medical devices once they are on the market.169 As
part of the PMA or 510(k) process, the FDA may require medical
device manufacturers to conduct postapproval studies “to identify
potential problems.”170 The FDA also requires medical device
manufacturers to prepare annual postapproval reports.171 As the GAO
report revealed, the FDA could use post-market regulation more
effectively to protect against information security threats.
MAUDE could help identify cybersecurity issues that impact
patient care. The FDA uses codes to categorize different types of
adverse events, and “although FDA does not categorize its codes as
specifically related to information security problems, it has codes in
place that could potentially identify information security problems
resulting from . . . intentional threats.”172 Adverse events may include
problems such as “(1) an application issue, (2) the unauthorized
access to a computer system, or (3) a computer-security issue.”173
The Veteran’s Administration (VA) Office of Information Security
manages a robust reporting system for malware infections.174 In its
database, the VA identified over 142 incidents involving 207 devices
between January 2009 and December 2011.175 The FDA could

168. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 163, at 3 (“[T]he FDA’s finite
resources would be better invested in developing an integrated premarket and postmarket
regulatory framework that provides a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness
throughout the device life cycle.”).
169. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 9-10; see 21 C.F.R. pt. 803
(West 2014).
170. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 10; see 21 C.F.R. pt. 803
(West 2014). For devices cleared through the 510(k) process, postapproval studies are called
“522 studies.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 10 n.18.
171. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 30-31.
172. Id. at 29-30.
173. Id. at 29.
174. See FDA Preparing for the Hacking of Medical Devices, ORTHOSTREAMS (Aug. 27,
2013), http://orthostreams.com/2013/08/fda-preparing-for-the-hacking-of-medical-devices.
175. See id.
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similarly use MAUDE to help flag cybersecurity flaws that lead to
adverse events. Given the FDA’s recent focus on cybersecurity
issues, the agency may be moving in this direction. Better software is
likely needed. As one researcher warns, in the MAUDE database
“real problems may be obscured by hundreds, if not thousands, of
unhelpful reports that are all lumped together.”176
To complement its adverse event reporting system, the FDA
could also require manufacturers to conduct postapproval studies of
their devices. According to the 2012 GAO report, “FDA officials
said that, while they could require manufacturers to conduct
postmarket studies to focus on information security risks, they did not
currently have plans to request that any manufacturers do so.”177 The
2013 FDA draft guidance on cybersecurity recommends that
manufacturers submit a “systematic plan for providing validated
updates and patches to operating systems or medical device software,
as needed, to provide up-to-date protection and to address the product
life-cycle.”178
Because the FDA has already requested that
manufacturers create a plan to keep their devices up-to-date, the FDA
could take this request one step further by requiring manufacturers to
conduct postmarket studies of device cybersecurity and report their
findings to the FDA. While it may be too costly to require all
manufacturers to conduct such studies, requiring postapproval studies
of high-risk devices could help ensure that manufacturers abide by the
cybersecurity plans submitted during the approval process.
The FDA could also require manufacturer postapproval reports
to include an analysis of cybersecurity concerns. Postapproval reports
must include information about any changes the manufacturer made
to the device during the preceding year, including software
changes.179 The reports must also detail any defects in the device
identified in scientific literature.180 The GAO report revealed,
however, that these reports may not be comprehensive. GAO
examined the annual postapproval reports of a defibrillator that
researchers hacked in a 2008 study. The postapproval reports did not
mention the study, even though it was published in scientific literature
and demonstrated a significant security flaw in the device.181

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. (describing presentation by Jay Radcliffe).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 30.
CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124, at 4.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 30-31.
Id. at 31.
Id.
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Similarly, the postapproval report of an insulin pump hacked by
researchers in 2010 did not include any reference to information
security issues.182 The FDA could take a more active role in auditing
these reports for accuracy and in emphasizing that these reports must
include cybersecurity risks.
In addition to more comprehensive adverse event reporting,
postapproval studies, and postapproval reports, the FDA should also
consider more proactive approaches to identifying new cyberattack
risks. The type of risk posed by an intentional cyberattack is different
from the type of risk posed by software or hardware flaws that
unintentionally cause injury. Intentional threats constantly evolve. A
device that is safe when first put on the market may develop a
security flaw as hackers develop new techniques or discover new
software vulnerabilities. Instead of monitoring adverse events and
manufacturer reports, the FDA should work with manufacturers to
proactively identify software flaws before cyberattacks occur. Part IV
describes some of the elements of a proactive and flexible regulatory
approach to protecting against cyberattacks.
2. FDA Regulation of Mobile Medical Applications
Following the proliferation of medical devices with software
components and the dramatic increase in health-related mobile
applications (apps), the FDA has begun to regulate these devices and
apps. The FDA has no “overarching software policy.”183 The text of
the FDCA is broad, defining a medical device to include any
“instrument,” “apparatus,” or “contrivance,” and “any component,
part, or accessory” that is used to diagnose or treat disease.184 The
FDA has reduced confusion over whom and what it will regulate by
releasing its September 2013 final guidance on MMAs185 and its Final
Rule on MDDSs.186 However, neither the MMA guidance nor the
MDDS rule mentions cybersecurity concerns. The FDA may need to

182. Id.
183. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF – MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS (2011) [hereinafter DRAFT GUIDANCE], available at
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/FDA-mHealth-DraftGuidance.pdf.
184. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2010).
185. FDA, MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND
DRUG
ADMINISTRATION
STAFF
(2013),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocu
ments/UCM263366.pdf.
186. See infra Part II.D.3.
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revisit its MMA classification scheme to ensure that its regulation of
MMAs takes into account the risk of cyberattacks.
The FDA defines MMAs broadly. An MMA is a device “used
as an accessory to a regulated medical device; or to transform a
mobile platform into a regulated medical device.”187 MMAs include
apps that perform the following functions: (1) “[d]isplaying, storing,
analyzing, or transmitting patient-specific medical device data” as an
extension of a medical device; (2) “[t]ransform[ing] a mobile
platform into a regulated medical device” by using “attachments,
display screens, [or] sensors;” or (3) “performing patient-specific
analysis and providing patient-specific diagnosis, or treatment
recommendations.”188 The FDA looks to an app’s “intended use” to
determine whether it is a regulated device, including its “labeling
claims, advertising materials, or oral or written statements by
manufacturers or their representatives.”189 If the app is used to
diagnose or treat disease, the app is a “device.” Almost any mobile
app that is useful to doctors in a medical setting will constitute an
MMA. According to FDA guidance, an app that controls a cell phone
light becomes a regulated medical device if the manufacturer markets
the app as a tool for examining patients.190
The FDA regulates MMAs based on the classification of the
device associated with the MMA or whose function the MMA
replaces. “[M]anufacturers must meet the requirements associated
with the applicable device classification.”191 For example, “a mobile
app that displays radiological images for diagnosis transforms the
mobile platform into a class II” device.192 An MMA manufacturer
includes not only the company that creates the app software but also
“anyone who initiates specifications, designs, [or] labels” the app.193
For example, a hospital is a device manufacturer if it hires a software
firm to design an MMA. This definition of “manufacturer” imposes
FDA oversight on hospitals, which also face HHS regulation of
information security under HIPAA. MMA distributors, such as
iTunes, do not constitute MMA manufacturers.194

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

FDA, supra note 185, at 12.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.
FDA, supra note 185, at 9.
Id. at 11.
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The FDA guidance on MMAs raises a number of important
questions about medical device and hospital network cybersecurity.
By expanding the definition of “device” to cover most medicalrelated mobile applications, the FDA opens the door to significant
regulation of MMAs. As the FDA begins to regulate more
comprehensively against cyberattacks, the FDA will be able to
regulate the security features of wireless and networked devices in
addition to mobile devices and even the software running mobile
devices. Because all of these devices work together, it makes sense to
develop an overarching regulatory approach to cybersecurity.
A device’s classification determines how much regulatory
oversight it receives. As a result, the classification of an MMA will
determine how closely the FDA scrutinizes the app’s information
security features. One potential issue is that a medical device may be
a Class I device—and thus subject to little or no regulation—which
could mean that an MMA associated with the device similarly
receives little or no scrutiny. While the MMA may not pose a health
risk to the patient, it may nevertheless constitute a cybersecurity
threat. MDDSs, for example, are Class I devices yet may still be
vulnerable to cyberattack.195 Similarly, Class II and a Class III
MMAs may pose exactly the same cybersecurity risk—and even run
on exactly the same software—but may receive different scrutiny
under the 510(k) and PMA approval processes. While the FDA’s
draft guidance on cybersecurity may help alleviate this inconsistency,
the FDA likely needs to develop a new classification scheme for
cybersecurity threats.
3. FDA Regulation of Medical Device Data Systems
In addition to its guidance on MMAs, the FDA has issued a final
rule governing MDDSs. These systems are “passive databases and
communications software products”196 that store information but do
not actively interact with medical devices or provide decision
support.197 An example of an MDDS is software that stores blood
pressure readings.198
Because of the lower risks associated with MDDSs, the FDA

195. See infra Part II.D.3.
196. Dolan, supra note 144.
197. Id.
198. Medical
Device
Data
Systems,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/GeneralHospitalDevicesan
dSupplies/MedicalDeviceDataSystems/default.htm (last updated Apr. 19, 2011).
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issued a final rule in 2011 that declassified MDDSs from Class III to
Class I medical devices. This rule makes MDDSs “exempt from
premarket review but still subject to quality standards.”199 The FDA’s
rationale for this rule is that quality controls are sufficient to ensure
the safety and effectiveness of MDDSs.200
Although the final MDDS rule downgraded MDDSs to Class I
devices, it also expanded FDA regulatory authority to include some
types of previously unregulated software.201 For example, the MDDS
classification now includes “hospital-derived software” with an
intended use in the medical field and “hardware, such as modems,
that are expressly promoted as part of the system.”202 The FDA’s
exertion of broader regulatory power over medical software makes
sense in part because this software could pose an information security
risk to medical devices or hospital networks, although it is not clear
that the FDA’s decision to broaden its regulatory power was
motivated by these concerns.
One potential danger in downgrading MDDSs to Class I devices
is that they will receive little regulatory oversight beyond the
specification of general controls. This is problematic if an MDDS
contains a security flaw that permits a malicious actor to hack an
entire hospital network. Because MDDSs are databases that store
information, they are targets for cyberattacks seeking PHI for medical
identity theft. MDDSs are also likely to be hooked up to hospital
networks so that physicians can remotely access the information
contained in the MDDS. A security flaw in an MDDS may allow a
malicious actor or malware to infiltrate a hospital network. It makes
little sense to impose the draft cybersecurity guidance on Class II and
Class III medical devices203 but not on Class I MDDSs. Accordingly,
the FDA should reconsider its classification system when evaluating
the cybersecurity risk posed by MDDSs that are connected to medical
networks.
4. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation
Act
The FDASIA of 2012 established a new pathway for classifying
medical devices. The FDASIA states that “[i]n lieu of submitting a

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
See Dolan, supra note 144.
Id.
CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124, at 2.
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report under section [510](k) . . . if a person determines there is no
legally marketed device upon which to base a determination of
substantial equivalence . . . a person may submit a request under this
clause for the Secretary to classify the device.”204 The FDASIA
responds in part to criticism of the “substantial equivalence”
framework of the 510(k) process. The FDA has not yet released
guidance on how it will implement the FDASIA, so it is difficult to
know how this law will change the regulatory process for medical
devices. The FDASIA permits the FDA to rethink its medical device
classification scheme, providing the FDA with an opportunity to
adopt a regulatory structure that better addresses the risk of
cyberattacks.
E. Tort Liability
Injured patients may have a civil cause of action against
malicious actors, hospitals, or medical device manufacturers
following a cyberattack against a medical device or hospital network.
On one hand, it seems unlikely that a court would find a legal barrier
to a civil suit against a malicious actor who conducts a cyberattack
and physically harms a person. On the other hand, cyberattacks do
not comfortably fit within the traditional framework of battery and
trespass to chattels actions. Until a body of case law develops, it is
unclear how these actions will play out in court. A patient injured by
a cyberattack may also have a cause of action against medical device
manufacturers and hospitals for negligence. The success of the suit
will likely depend on how the court treats the superseding cause
doctrine and on how the court views the defendant’s standard of care.
It is likely that state courts will ultimately develop doctrines that
impose liability on medical device manufacturers and hospitals that
negligently fail to take precautions against cyberattacks. Without
more certainty, however, the threat of civil liability may not provide a
sufficient incentive for medical device manufacturers and hospitals to
adopt cybersecurity measures.
1. Malicious Actors
Plaintiffs harmed in a cyberattack may bring suit against the
cyberattacker under tort theories including battery and trespass to

204. 21
U.S.C.
§
360c(f)(2)(A)(ii)
(2012),
available
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2012-title21/pdf/USCODE-2012-title21-chap9subchapV-partA-sec360c.pdf.

at
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chattels.205 A battery theory is likely to succeed, although courts have
yet to grapple with potentially thorny issues such as whether a
cyberattack satisfies the “intent” and “offensive touching” elements of
battery. Trespass to chattels, which is the intentional interference
with personal property leading to injury, is another potential cause of
action. Courts will likely need to reinterpret elements of both torts to
address the issues raised by digital attacks that cause physical harm to
patients.
a. Battery
Battery requires an intentional “offensive touching of the
plaintiff’s person, or something so closely associated with the plaintiff
as to make the touching tantamount to a physical invasion of the
plaintiff’s person.”206 Courts are split on whether:
[T]he Second Restatement’s definition of intent is properly
interpreted to require both intent to make bodily contact and, in
addition, intent to harm or offend (dual intent), or whether it is
sufficient that the defendant intends to make a bodily contact that
207
turns out to be harmful or offensive (single intent).

Plaintiffs may have difficulty proving the “intent” element of
battery in some cyberattack cases.
A malicious actor who
intentionally conducts a cyberattack against a medical device likely
meets the “intent” prong. A programmer who writes malware that
happens to infect a medical device and harm a patient, however, may
not have “intent” to commit battery. First, the programmer may not
have intended the code to have any effect on physical reality,
undermining the argument that the programmer intended a “touching
of the plaintiff’s person.” Second, the programmer may not have
intended harm. For example, the programmer may only have
intended to steal a patient’s medical identity, not cause physical
injury. In cases where the plaintiff can only show intent to touch the
plaintiff’s person and not intent to cause harm, the definition of intent
adopted by the court will likely govern the outcome of the case.
Satisfying the element of “offensive touching” may also be
difficult. The success of the action may depend on how closely

205. Some commentators have suggested that a plaintiff may also have a nuisance claim
against a cyberattacker. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 53-54 (2000).
206. Neal Hoffman, Battery 2.0: Upgrading Offensive Contact Battery to the Digital Age,
1 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 61, 68 (2010).
207. See Kerr, supra note 80, at 1597.
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associated a medical device is with the plaintiff’s body.
comments to the Second Restatement of Torts note that:

177
The

Since the essence of the plaintiff’s grievance consists in the offense
to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion
of the inviolability of his person and not in any physical harm done
to his body, it is not necessary that the plaintiff’s actual body be
disturbed. Unpermitted and intentional contacts with anything so
connected with the body as to be customarily regarded as part of
the other person and therefore as partaking of its inviolability is
208
actionable as an offensive contact with her person.

There is a strong argument that at least some medical devices,
such as pacemakers and insulin pumps, are “closely associated with
the plaintiff.” Other medical devices, however, may not be as closely
integrated with the plaintiff’s physical body. A heart rate monitor, for
example, may play an important role in monitoring a patient’s health.
A cyberattack against a hospital network that shuts down the heart
rate monitor, or that prevents the physician from accessing the heart
rate monitor from a mobile device, may have no physical effect on the
patient. However, without the ability to monitor the patient, the
physician may not catch the warning signs of a heart attack. While it
seems likely that a court would stretch the element of “offensive
touching” to apply in this type of situation, it is also possible that
some courts may decline to find this element of battery satisfied.
Courts may also struggle with defining “touching” to include digital
touching, although courts may overcome this hurdle by defining
“touching” broadly or by focusing on the physical movement of
electrons. While it seems likely that a court would hold a defendant
liable for intentionally harming a patient through a cyberattack, courts
may need to reinterpret traditional tort principles to address the issues
raised by digital attacks that cause physical harm.
b. Trespass to Chattels
Trespass to chattels is a tort that some courts have applied in the
context of unauthorized use of computer systems. “Trespass to
chattels lies where an intentional interference with the possession of
personal property has proximately cause[d] injury.”209 To establish a
claim, the plaintiff must show that “(1) defendant intentionally and
without authorization interfered with plaintiff’s possessory interest in
the computer system; and (2) defendant’s unauthorized use
208.
209.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. c (1965).
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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proximately resulted in damage to the plaintiff.”210 In eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder’s Edge, Inc., eBay alleged that another company’s
unauthorized access to its website had increased the load on its
system, resulting in monetary damages.211 The court found for eBay,
holding that eBay had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits for a trespass to chattels claim because the defendant company
had repeatedly accessed information on eBay’s website without
permission.212
When a malicious actor accesses a medical device or hospital
network without permission, downloading data or interfering with the
device, the owner of the medical device or network may have a claim
for trespass to chattels if the court follows the reasoning of the eBay
decision. The patient relying on the medical device or hospital
network, however, may not have a claim under this tort theory unless
she has a possessory interest in the device or network. The trespass to
chattels doctrine may therefore allow a hospital to sue a malicious
actor who attacks its network or device, but it may not provide a
cause of action for an injured patient. Trespass to chattels is
ultimately an old doctrine with uncertain application in the digital era.
While some courts may allow a trespass to chattels claim, others may
not. The legal uncertainty around the application of battery and
trespass to chattels theories may reduce the deterrence effect of tort
law on the malicious actors behind cyberattacks.
2. Medical Device Manufacturers and Hospitals
A hospital or medical device manufacturer may be negligent if it
fails to adopt reasonable cybersecurity measures. It may be difficult,
however, to define the duty of care in the context of cyberattacks.
Experts have only recently identified cyberattacks as a realistic threat.
Furthermore, cybersecurity standards will continue to evolve, making
the identification of a standard of care difficult. In some states, the
superseding cause doctrine blocks negligence liability where a
malicious actor is the direct cause of a plaintiff’s injuries.
Additionally, Riegel v. Medtronic dictates that once the FDA clears a
medical device through the PMA process, plaintiffs cannot sue the
device manufacturer in tort under most circumstances.213 Given these
difficulties, the success of a negligence action against a medical
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1069-70.
See id. at 1061-63.
See id.
Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
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device manufacturer or hospital is uncertain.
a. Duty of Care
At common law, a hospital or medical device manufacturer is
negligent if it breaches a duty of care towards an injured individual.
The duty of care to ensure that networks and devices are secure from
outside intrusion is unclear. It is likely that a court would look to
HIPAA standards to help define at least the lower limit of a hospital’s
duty of care. Other standards, such as those promulgated by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology214 or the International
Organization for Standardization,215 may also serve as a benchmark
for the duty of care. HIPAA standards do not generally apply to
medical device manufacturers, however, and thus a court may or may
not hold a medical device manufacturer to relevant HIPAA standards.
While the recent FDA draft guidance on cybersecurity may provide a
benchmark for courts, the guidance is general and non-binding.216
Until courts regularly grapple with negligence suits following
cyberattacks, the duty of care is likely to remain uncertain.
The duty of care is also complicated by the fact that information
security measures may detract from patient care.
Installing
encryption or security programs on implantable medical devices may
require larger batteries, which in turn could require either larger
devices—potentially decreasing the safety and efficacy of the medical
device—or devices with a significantly shorter battery life. Battery
life is especially important for implantable medical devices like
pacemakers. A court may hesitate to impose such a duty of care on a
medical device manufacturer. Network security features, such as
complicated login systems, may make it more difficult for doctors to
access patient information in emergency situations. Mobile device
security requirements may also make it more difficult for doctors to
check on patients remotely.
The FDA’s draft guidance on
cybersecurity recognizes the tension between security and patient
care.217 These arguments could sway courts in at least some cases to
214. See Computer Security Division, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/index.cfm (last updated Jan. 18, 2013).
215. See
INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION
FOR
STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/home.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
216. See CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124.
217. See CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124, at 3 (“Manufacturers
should also carefully consider the balance between cybersecurity safeguards and the usability of
the device in its intended environment . . . . For example, security controls should not hinder
access to the device during an emergency situation.”).
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find no duty of care to adopt certain security measures.
The class action plaintiffs’ complaint in a data breach case
against TJX Companies outlines some of the arguments a plaintiff
might bring in a negligence case against a medical device
manufacturer or hospital following a cyberattack. After a hacker stole
the credit card information of thousands of TJX customers, affected
customers brought a complaint alleging that TJX had a “special
fiduciary relationship” with its customers because it stored customers’
personal and financial information and that this relationship created a
“duty of care to use reasonable means to keep nonpublic information
of the Class private and secure.”218 Plaintiffs alleged that TJX was
negligent because it failed to comply with industry standards and
because the data breach was extremely large and took place over a 14month period.219 In a cyberattack case, plaintiffs might similarly
argue that a medical device manufacturer, and especially a hospital,
has a fiduciary relationship with its patients, creating a duty of care to
protect against cyberattacks.220 The level of compliance with industry
standards and the magnitude of the attack may also factor into the
duty of care.
Critics have noted that HIPAA standards do not go far enough in
requiring security measures for mobile devices. For example, HIPAA
does not require “the ability to remotely wipe sensitive patient data”
on mobile devices.221 If a hospital or medical device manufacturer
meets HIPAA standards but does not go beyond them, a court may
find that it has satisfied the duty of care—even if the HIPAA

218. Complaint at 38, In re TJX Companies Retail Security Breach Litigation, No. 0710162-WGY
(D.
Mass.
Dec.
20,
2007),
available
at
http://sp09tcs401601pbj.pbworks.com/f/class+action+lawsuit.pdf.
219. Id.
220. The fiduciary duties of hospitals towards patients is unclear, but “[s]ome American
courts have begun to assume a fiduciary obligation in the hospital setting.” Barry R. Furrow,
Patient Safety and the Fiduciary Hospital: Sharpening Judicial Remedies, 440 DREXEL L. REV.
439,
461
(2009),
available
at
http://www.earlemacklaw.drexel.edu/~/media/Files/law/law%20review/furrow.ashx.
In
Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., for example, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed a lower
court’s finding that Washington Hospital was negligent for failing to adopt the latest carbon
dioxide monitoring technology. Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 183
(D.C. Cir. 1990). It is possible that a court would similarly find that a hospital was negligent for
failing to adopt the latest cybersecurity standards, especially where other similar hospitals have
done so.
221. Greg Slabodkin, New HIPAA Rule Falls Short in Protecting Mobile Patient
Information,
FIERCE
MOBILE
HEALTHCARE
(Jan.
20,
2013),
http://www.fiercemobilehealthcare.com/story/new-hipaa-rule-needed-expand-its-reachprotecting-mobile-patient-informatio/2013-01-20.
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standards do not adequately protect medical device or hospital
network information security. The fact that HIPAA does not apply to
most medical device manufacturers, and that HIPAA addresses
threats to protected health information rather than all types of
cyberattacks, makes it difficult in many cases for courts to use
HIPAA to determine the duty of care. While the FDA draft
cybersecurity guidelines are applicable to medical device
manufacturers, they are not applicable to hospital networks. These
guidelines are also general and non-binding. Without a clear duty of
care, a court may hesitate to impose liability for negligence. Given
these potential obstacles to tort liability, Part IV outlines three
potential approaches to addressing the threat of cyberattacks on
medical devices and hospital networks.
b. Superseding Cause
Hospitals and medical device manufacturers may also avoid tort
liability if a court finds that the malicious actor behind a cyberattack
is the “superseding cause” of the attack. “A ‘superseding cause’ is an
intervening act that operates to relieve the original actor of liability
for the ultimate harm even though the original actor was a factual
cause of that harm.”222 Courts generally adopt one of two approaches
to superseding cause.223 Under the first approach, the court will find a
superseding cause only if the intervening act is unforeseeable.
Foreseeability is a matter of fact for the jury to decide.224 Under the
second approach, adopted by the Third Restatement of Torts, the
court focuses on proximate cause rather than the foreseeability of the
intervening act.225 The Third Restatement “focuses the inquiry on
whether the type of harm suffered by the injured party was within the
scope of the risk presented by the original actor’s tortious conduct.”226
This proximate cause analysis looks at whether the “ultimate harm” is

222. Jim Gash, At the Intersection of Proximate Cause and Terrorism: A Contextual
Analysis of the (Proposed) Restatement Third of Torts’ Approach to Intervening and
Superseding Causes, 91 KY. L.J. 523, 581 (2003).
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Duphily v. Delaware Elec. Co-op., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 830-31 (Del. 1995)
(“[A]n intervening negligent act will not relieve the original tortfeasor from liability if: the
original tortfeasor at the time of his negligence should have realized (foreseen) that another’s
negligence might cause harm; or, if a reasonable person would not consider the occurrence of
the intervening act as highly extraordinary; or, if the intervening act was not extraordinarily
negligent.”).
225. Jim Gash, supra note 222, at 595.
226. Id.
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foreseeable, not whether the intervening act is foreseeable.227
These two different formulations of the superseding cause
doctrine can lead to different outcomes. The first approach asks
whether it is foreseeable that a malicious actor would conduct a
cyberattack on a medical device or hospital network. Because there
have been no reported cases of patient harm caused by cyberattacks
on medical devices or networks, there is an argument that these
attacks are not foreseeable. However, the GAO report and researcher
experiments demonstrating that medical devices can be hacked
provide a good argument that hospitals and medical device
manufacturers should foresee cyberattacks.228 Malware attacks on
devices and hospital networks are much more common and thus are
more foreseeable. The specific type of attack, however, may not be
foreseeable. It is therefore difficult to know how a court would rule
on the issue of foreseeability.
The second approach asks whether it is foreseeable that
negligence by medical device manufacturers or hospitals would lead
to harm from cyberattacks. This too is an open question. According
to Professors Kesan and Hayes, “[b]ecause the connection between
cybersecurity measures and cyberattacks is self-evident, and lax
cybersecurity could foreseeably lead to negative consequences from
cyberattacks, a court following the [second approach] would likely
find that the causal relationship is preserved, and would thus be likely
to conclude that proximate cause still exists.”229 However, there is
also an argument that no matter how good the information security
measures, a creative actor may find a way to breach them. The
foreseeability issue may in part depend on the creativity of the attack.
Again, it is difficult to know how courts will rule on the issue of
foreseeability under the second approach, adding one more level of
uncertainty to a negligence claim against hospitals and medical device
manufacturers.
c. Riegel v. Medtronic
Under Riegel v. Medtronic,230 manufacturers of medical devices
cleared through the lengthy and expensive PMA process are generally

227. Id.
228. See supra Part I.A; see also infra Part II.D.
229. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and
Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 487 (2012), available at
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v25/25HarvJLTech429.pdf.
230. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
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not subject to state tort suits.231 In Riegel, the Supreme Court “held
that because the FDA imposes rigorous design, manufacturing, and
labeling requirements on Class III devices, tort claims that would
impose requirements different from or additional to the FDA’s
requirements are preempted.”232 State tort law that is “‘parallel’” to
FDA requirements is not preempted.233 Tort suits against the
manufacturers of devices that have been approved under the 510(k)
process, including many Class III devices cleared under 510(k), are
also not preempted.234 Because most wireless devices, such as insulin
pumps, are Class II devices, the majority of tort suits are not
preempted. However, some important medical devices—such as
cardiac defibrillators—are Class III devices cleared under the PMA
process.
Class III devices are “life-supporting or life-sustaining, or for a
use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of
human health, or if the device presents a potential unreasonable risk
of illness or injury.”235 For this reason, malicious actors may target
PMA-cleared Class III devices for cyberattacks. Because Riegel as a
policy measure places its trust in the FDA to ensure the safety of
PMA-cleared devices, it is especially important for the FDA to
regulate the information security features of these PMA-cleared
devices. While the FDA has released draft guidance on cybersecurity,
this guidance is not mandatory. Part IV discusses potential reforms
that could give the FDA a greater role in medical device
cybersecurity.
III. GAPS IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Three different legal structures govern cyberattacks against
medical devices and hospital networks. Criminal law focuses
primarily on deterring the malicious actors behind cyberattacks.
Federal regulatory regimes such as the FDCA and HIPAA provide a
framework for regulating medical device manufacturers and
healthcare providers. Common law principles may impose liability

231. See id.
232. See Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Medical Devices and Preemption: A Defense of Parallel
Claims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA Regulations, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1196,
1196 (2011).
233. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.
234. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
235. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012title21-vol8/pdf/CFR-2012-title21-vol8-sec860-3.pdf.

BOOTH WELLINGTON

184

4/2/2014 10:58 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

on medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers that
negligently fail to protect against cyberattacks. As described in this
Part, however, these legal structures do not fully address the threat of
cyberattacks. As long as it remains difficult to identify and prosecute
the actors behind cyberattacks, criminal law is an insufficient
deterrent. FDCA and HIPAA were not designed to protect against
cyberattacks against medical devices and do not provide sufficient
regulatory safeguards in this area. The scope of negligence liability
for medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers is untested
and unclear. New approaches are needed to address the threat of
cyberattacks.
A. Difficulty of Effective Prosecution of Malicious Actors
Behind Cyberattacks
The malicious actors behind cyberattacks face criminal liability
under several federal statutes in addition to common law civil liability
and possible state criminal liability. However, the difficulty of
identifying and prosecuting cyberattackers greatly undercuts the
deterrence power of these laws.236
As many commentators have noted, it is often difficult or
impossible to identify the actor behind a cyberattack.237 “In
cyberspace, attackers can hide their identity, cover their tracks.
Worse, they may be able to mislead, placing blame on others by
spoofing the source.”238 For example, the malicious actor behind a
2009 DDoS attack against U.S. and South Korean government and
business websites remains unknown.239 Because the attack was

236. Some academic literature questions whether our current legal regime ever achieves
deterrence. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 818-23 (2010) (“Criminal deterrence may
have its limits precisely because the legal costs are far removed in time and people find it
difficult to feel the pain of the longer-term consequences of their actions.”).
237. See, e.g., Stephenie Gosnell Handler, The New Cyber Face of Battle: Developing a
Legal Approach to Accommodate Emerging Trends in Warfare, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 209, 213
(2012) (“[I]t is extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to definitely identify where a
cybercrime or cyberattacks originates.
And, even if the location is identified, the
perpetrator . . . may even remain anonymous.”); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 229, at 438 (“It is
almost impossible to accurately and consistently identify attackers, which severely complicates
any steps that might be taken to uncover those responsible and hold them accountable for their
actions.”). See generally Duncan B. Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373,
397-404 (2011) (describing some of the many reasons why it is difficult to identify the actors
behind a cyberattack).
238. Richard Clarke, War from Cyberspace, NAT’L INT., Nov.-Dec. 2009, available at
http://nationalinterest.org/article/war-from-cyberspace-3278.
239. Hollis, supra note 237, at 397.
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relatively unsophisticated, almost anyone could have orchestrated
it.240 Criminal law may attempt to deter crimes where few
perpetrators are caught by making the penalties large. While
penalties under the CFAA and the Anti-Tampering Act are large—
ranging from five to twenty years in prison241—even large penalties
may fail to deter where identification of the perpetrator is very
difficult.242 In the near term, it is unlikely that it will become any
easier to identify the actors behind cyberattacks.243
Once identified, it may be difficult to prosecute cyberattackers.
Selecting the appropriate venue may be challenging if the attack
occurs across state or national lines.244 For domestic defendants, “the
complexity of Internet routing creates jurisdictional conflicts among
the localities, states, and countries that wish to exercise jurisdiction
over transient information packets.”245 Prosecution of foreign
defendants is even more difficult. U.S. criminal statutes like the
CFAA likely do not apply extraterritorially.246 If the cyberattacker
resides outside of the United States, she may succeed in dismissing a
suit on forum non conveniens grounds.247
While there are
international regimes in place to address cyberattacks, foreign
governments do not consistently enforce them.248
Although criminal liability for cyberattacks under statutes like
the CFAA is relatively clear, civil liability is murkier due to
unresolved questions about how torts like battery and trespass to
chattels apply in cyberspace.249 Plaintiffs may be unsure which tort
theory to choose, and courts may differ on how broadly they interpret

240. Id.
241. See supra Part II.B.
242. See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as
a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1232 (1985) (“[I]t is emphasized that if the probability is
too low, it will not be possible to deter certain parties even with the threat of the highest
conceivable sanctions.”).
243. See Hollis, supra note 237, at 402-03.
244. Id.
245. Michael Lee et al., Electronic Commerce, Hackers, and the Search for Legitimacy: A
Regulatory Proposal, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 839, 873 (1999).
246. See id.; Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817,
874 & n.275 (2012) (noting that “[t]here is generally a presumption against extraterritorial
application of federal law” under United States v. Cotton and discussing exceptions to this rule).
247. Id.
248. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 229, at 496 (“Because there is significant uncertainty
over how to address cyberattacks under international law, potential attackers are unlikely to be
deterred by the threat of criminal charges in other countries . . . .”).
249. See supra Part II.E.1.
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common law principles to accommodate digital acts.250
The malicious actors behind cyberattacks may also be relatively
judgment proof,251 decreasing the deterrence effect of tort liability and
increasing the risk that cyberattacks will lead to uncompensated harm.
The actors behind recent cyberattacks against the Department of
Defense have ranged from Chinese military agents to a sixteen-yearold Florida student.252 Conducting a cyberattack may not require
extensive investment253 but may nevertheless lead to significant
physical and monetary harm to patients and healthcare providers.
Together, the difficulty of identifying, prosecuting, and
recovering damages from the malicious actors behind cyberattacks
counsels against relying solely on criminal and civil penalties against
these actors to deter attacks.
B. Poor Fit of Current FDA Device Classification Scheme to
Cyberattack Threat
The current medical device classification system does not always
reflect the cyberattack risk posed by a particular device. Traditional
medical devices fall under one of three classifications, with Class I
devices receiving little oversight and Class III devices often
undergoing the extremely expensive PMA process.254 MMAs receive
the same classification as the device they are associated with.255 The
FDA regulates MDDSs as Class I medical devices.256
In the case of targeted attacks against an individual’s wireless
medical device, such as a pacemaker or insulin pump, the current
classification scheme aligns with the threat posed by a cyberattack.
The importance of the device to the patient’s health will likely
correlate with the potential harm to the patient if a malicious actor
manipulates or disables the device.
In the case of cyberattacks against MDDSs or hospital networks,
however, the medical device classification may bear little relation to
the risk posed by a cyberattack. To the extent that a medical device

250. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 229, at 496.
251. See id. at 438 (“Cyberattacks are not resource-intensive, which renders them even
more dangerous because no practical requirement exists to limit the attackers to being members
of organized and well-funded sources such as a nation’s military.”).
252. Handler, supra note 237, at 213-14.
253. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 229, at 470.
254. See supra Part II.D.1.
255. See supra Part II.D.2.
256. See supra Part II.D.3.
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of any classification is connected to a hospital network, it may be
used as an entry point to disrupt the network or steal information from
the network. Whether an MMA is a Class II device used as an insulin
monitor or a Class I device used to create a meal plan for a diabetic, a
flaw in the MMA software could pose a security risk to the entire
hospital network. Class I MDDSs may be “passive” repositories of
patient data and thus may pose little risk to patient health. However,
repositories of patient data are a treasure trove for identity thieves.
From an identity theft perspective, a Class III pacemaker containing
the identifying information of one patient may be far less valuable
than a Class I passive database containing thousands of patient
records. The exact same type of device may run on off-the-shelf
software that is more vulnerable to cyberattacks or on proprietary
software that is less vulnerable to cyberattacks.257 The current device
classification system does not reflect these distinctions. Concerns
over the fit of the medical device classification system to the threat
posed by cyberattacks support the need for further regulatory reforms,
such as those discussed in Part IV.
C. The Role of Medical Device Manufacturers and Large
Healthcare Providers in Preventing Cyberattacks
Medical device manufacturers and large healthcare providers
play an important role in preventing cyberattacks. The FDA
recognizes this, stating in a 2009 “Reminder from the FDA” that
“cybersecurity for medical devices and their assembled
communication networks is a shared responsibility between medical
device manufacturers and medical device user facilities.”258 One
striking feature of the current regulatory regime, however, is that it
does not harness the ability of industry to adopt cybersecurity
measures. According to one commentator, the CFAA “does not
provide an incentive for anyone to adopt adequate anti-hacking
security measures. In fact, network security remains at a[] shockingly
low level and is virtually nonexistent in many companies despite the
severity of the hacking threat.”259
While medical device
manufacturers may adopt the FDA draft guidance on cybersecurity,
this guidance is not mandatory.
New legal and regulatory
frameworks are needed to ensure that medical device manufacturers
and large healthcare providers protect against cyberattacks.
257.
258.
259.

See ATTACK SURFACE, supra note 13, at 2.
See Reminder from FDA, supra note 29.
Lee et al., supra note 245, at 873 n.147.
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IV. SOLUTIONS TO STATUTORY AND REGULATORY GAPS
Because the current statutory and regulatory framework is not
adequate to address the threat of cyberattacks on medical devices and
hospital networks, new approaches are needed. One potential
approach is industry self-regulation. A second approach is to equip
the FDA with expanded authority and resources to identify and
address security risks before cyberattacks occur. This would likely
require a new focus by the agency, which has previously relied on a
backward-looking analysis of adverse events rather than a forwardlooking analysis of emerging security threats. FAA regulation of
airline safety could provide a model for this type of regulatory
process. A third approach is to create a new legislative framework to
address cyberattacks. Because HIPAA provides a preexisting model
for addressing information security issues in the healthcare industry,
an expansion of HIPAA to cover medical device manufacturers and to
protect against the risk of all types of intentional cyberattacks—not
just those involving PHI—is one potential legislative solution. All
three approaches provide a starting point for considering solutions to
twenty-first century cybersecurity threats.
A. Industry Self-Regulation
Industry self-regulation is common in the healthcare space and
could play an important role in helping to design hospital networks
and medical devices that are less vulnerable to cyberattacks. Two
examples of industry self-regulation are The Joint Commission’s
healthcare provider accreditation process260 and the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Code261 for
pharmaceutical marketing activities. The Joint Commission is an
independent non-profit that accredits and certifies over 20,000
healthcare programs and organizations in the United States.262 As an
independent organization, The Joint Commission mediates between
private industry, state regulators, and patients without the strictures of
the administrative rulemaking process.263 The Joint Commission

260. See
About
The
Joint
Commission,
THE
JOINT
COMMISSION,
http://www.jointcommission.org/about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx (last visited
Feb. 9, 2014).
261. See Code on Interactions with Health Care Professionals, PHRMA,
http://www.phrma.org/code-on-interactions-with-healthcare-professionals (last visited Feb. 9,
2014).
262. See About The Joint Commission, supra note 260.
263. See id.
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releases new standards annually and frequently posts policy revisions
on its website,264 leading to an adoption of new standards that is more
rapid than a state or federal regulatory process. Compliance with
these standards is often mandatory because states require many
healthcare providers to receive accreditation from an organization
such as The Joint Commission.265
The Joint Commission
accreditation process represents a successful approach to industry
self-regulation that permits the ongoing creation of new standards in
consultation with both private industry and public regulators to
address new challenges in the healthcare industry.
The PhRMA Code is another example of industry selfregulation. To address concerns over pharmaceutical marketing
practices, industry participants created the PhRMA Code’s voluntary
guidelines for marketing activities.266 Shortly thereafter, the U.S.
Office of Inspector General, which investigates healthcare fraud and
abuse, designated the PhRMA Code as the minimum standard for
marketing to healthcare professionals,267 laying the groundwork for
later legislation. The Physician Payment Sunshine Act of 2009,
adopted as part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), built on the
PhRMA Code and FDA guidelines by requiring certain disclosures
related to marketing practices.268 By developing and voluntarily
adopting the PhRMA Code, industry participants took the first steps
towards addressing an important industry concern and also helped
shape future legal and regulatory requirements.
The Joint Commission accreditation process and the PhRMA
Code demonstrate that industry self-regulation can help address safety
concerns and confront new industry challenges. In the highly
regulated healthcare industry, self-regulation may play an important
role in a larger government regulatory framework. As healthcare
providers and medical device manufacturers begin to confront the
challenges posed by cybersecurity, they could develop industry

264. See,
e.g.,
Hospitals
(CAMH),
THE
JOINT
COMMISSION,
http://www.jointcommission.org/standards_information/hap_requirements.aspx (last visited Feb.
9, 2014).
265. See
State
Recognition,
THE
JOINT
COMMISSION,
http://www.jointcommission.org/state_recognition/state_recognition.aspx (last visited Feb. 9,
2014).
266. See Howard L. Dorfman, The 2009 Revision to the PhRMA Code on Interactions with
Healthcare Professionals: Challenges and Opportunities for the Pharmaceutical Industry in the
Age of Compliance, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 361, 361 (2009).
267. Id. at 362.
268. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(h) (West 2014).
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standards to guide the creation of new software and systems that help
protect against cyberattacks. This type of approach could allow
industry to more quickly and flexibly address emerging cybersecurity
threats while potentially reducing the need for burdensome federal
and state regulatory requirements. Because the FDA is likely to take
an increasing role in cybersecurity regulation, an industry attempt to
address these issues could also lead to a better dialogue between the
agency and medical device manufacturers. The PhRMA Code
provided an important starting place for later laws and regulations
addressing pharmaceutical and medical device marketing, and
medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers would be wise
to similarly take a proactive stance towards developing new
approaches to address the threat of cyberattacks.
B. Forward-Looking FDA Regulation to Address Rapidly
Evolving Threats
A second approach to protecting against cyberattacks is to
develop a FDA regulatory structure that proactively identifies and
protects against evolving information security threats. This would
represent a shift from existing agency practice. Currently, the FDA
relies primarily on adverse event reporting and postmarket studies to
monitor the continuing effectiveness of medical devices—techniques
that may be ineffective at preventing cyberattacks before they occur.
In conjunction with a more forward-looking approach, the FDA could
develop a flexible regulatory process that permits the agency to work
with medical device manufacturers and hospitals to address
cyberattack threats in proportion to the risk posed.
The FDA’s draft guidance on cybersecurity is a step in the right
direction. The guidance adopts several of the information security
recommendations listed in the GAO report, such as encryption
software, frequent antivirus and anti-spyware updates, and
authentication procedures.269 The FDA has solicited comments on the
guidance270 and will likely use it as a starting point for developing
more detailed cybersecurity standards. The FDA has also recently
released twenty-five new standards for medical device
interoperability and security.271 In conjunction with industry and

269. See ATTACK SURFACE, supra note 13, at 2; CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS,
supra note 124, at 3-4.
270. See CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124.
271. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Recognizes Certain Standards for Interoperability
and
Cybersecurity
of
Medical
Devices,
FDA,
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cybersecurity experts, the FDA should continue to develop standards
that help secure the thousands of different types of medical devices
and networks against cyberattacks.
Building on these standards, the FDA should develop a strategy
for identifying cybersecurity threats before they materialize, rather
than after malicious actors exploit them. The FDA does not currently
regulate hospital networks,272 and the agency relies on a system of
adverse event reporting, postapproval studies, and postapproval
reports to monitor medical devices already on the market.273 Adverse
event reporting identifies medical device flaws only after patient harm
(or a near miss) has occurred. Annual postapproval reports may come
too late to alert the FDA of cyberattack threats. While postapproval
studies could focus on information security risks, these studies
generally focus on risks identified at the time the device was
approved, not risks that emerge later.274 The FDA’s Sentinel System,
a national electronic system that monitors the postmarket safety of
medical products, represents an initiative to replace passive
postmarket monitoring with more active surveillance.275 However,
even this initiative focuses on recognizing safety issues as they occur
rather than on preventing them from occurring in the first place.276
Protecting against intentional cyberattacks requires a different
approach than protecting against unintentional medical device defects.
The FDA has announced that it will develop a cybersecurity
laboratory to test medical devices for security flaws.277 If the FDA
uses this lab to continuously and proactively monitor the
cybersecurity of medical devices currently on the market, this lab
could be a valuable tool in protecting against cyberattacks. In order
to use this lab effectively, however, the FDA will have to equip itself

http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/ucm364035.htm (last updated
Aug. 6, 2013).
272. See Mearian, supra note 2.
273. See supra Part II.B.
274. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Post-Approval Studies (PAS) – Frequently Asked
Questions
(FAQ),
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequirements/P
ostApprovaStudies/ucm135263.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
275. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE SENTINEL INITIATIVE: NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
MONITORING
MEDICAL
PRODUCT
SAFETY
4
(2008),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/UCM124701.pdf.
276. See id. at 8 (discussing how FDA will improve collection and analysis of data to
identify existing safety issues).
277. FDA to Develop Cybersecurity Laboratory, AAMI NEWS (July 24, 2013),
http://www.aami.org/news/2013/072413_FDA_Cybersecurity_Lab.html.
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with the latest information about potential new medical device
security flaws. In addition to hiring scientists, the FDA should hire
hackers who can pinpoint new security vulnerabilities. The FDA
should also develop a program to work with other government
agencies, security companies, medical device manufacturers, and
healthcare providers to identify and find solutions to new information
security risks. The biggest challenge will be to identify and respond
to new cyberattack threats quickly enough to flag these issues for
manufacturers and healthcare providers before attacks materialize.
The FDA may need to seek additional funding and potentially new
regulatory authority from Congress to take on this type of role in
identifying and protecting against cyberattacks.
In addition to conducting its own proactive monitoring of
cybersecurity risks, the FDA should leverage industry compliance
programs to ensure manufacturers similarly identify and protect
against new threats. Medical device manufacturers are likely in the
best position to know the weaknesses in their devices and to monitor
their devices for new vulnerabilities. The FDA’s draft guidance
recommends that manufacturers create a systematic plan for updating
device security.278 If the FDA can require manufacturers to develop
robust cybersecurity programs to gain approval for their devices, the
FDA can then monitor manufacturers to ensure compliance with these
programs. However, the FDA may need to issue new regulations or
look to Congress for authority to penalize device manufacturers who
do not adhere to their cybersecurity programs.
Once the FDA identifies a new risk through its own investigation
or through industry reporting, it will have to develop a flexible and
tailored approach to mitigating the risk. Unlike hardware flaws that
are difficult to repair—such as faulty wiring in a pacemaker—
software flaws may be easier to fix. Unlike hardware flaws, however,
a mandatory software patch may quickly turn into a liability if it
hinders future security patches or creates a new vulnerability. The
FDA will have to tread carefully. If the FDA promulgates very
specific cybersecurity standards and ties premarket review or
approval to meeting these standards, there is a significant risk that
such standards will quickly become outmoded. Out-of-date standards
that do little to improve cybersecurity may impose unnecessary costs
on companies. By requiring one method of addressing a security
threat, out-of-date standards could hinder cybersecurity by preventing

278.

CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124, at 5.
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companies from adopting a new and better method of addressing a
security flaw. Many medical device companies are unwilling to
update outmoded software because of the fear that their products will
lose FDA approval;279 detailed FDA regulation of cybersecurity could
further exacerbate this problem.
The FAA’s airworthiness directive process serves as a model for
a regulatory process where the agency takes an active role in
identifying and remedying ongoing, and sometimes minor, safety
risks. If the FAA finds that unsafe conditions exist, the FAA may
issue an airworthiness directive that requires air carriers to correct the
unsafe condition within a certain period of time.280 The FAA may
also approve an “alternative method of compliance,” such as the use
of different procedures or service instructions, as long as an
“acceptable level of safety is maintained.”281 The FAA adopted the
airworthiness directive process as a way to improve safety by
increasing coordination between the agency and the airline
industry.282 A similar approach that is focused on communication
between the FDA and medical device manufacturers and hospitals
could improve safety while leaving room to flexibly address evolving
cybersecurity threats.
Many different government agencies will need to rethink their
regulatory processes to respond to rapidly evolving technology and
the threat of intentional cyberattacks. Monitoring adverse events may
be sufficient to detect and correct unintentional risks; fighting
intentional attacks may require a more proactive and vigilant
approach. Speed and flexibility will be important. While the
Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment process does not
lend itself to these characteristics, the FDA could look to other
regulatory agencies such as the FAA for examples of how to quickly
and flexibly respond to new risks.
C. Expanding HIPAA to Address the Threat of Cyberattacks on
Medical Devices and Hospital Networks
While FDA reforms will help, Congress must ultimately revisit

279.
280.

See Talbot, supra note 24.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE 2006-15-15: PROCESS REVIEW
TECHNICAL
REPORT
4
(2009),
available
at
http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/continued_operation/media/AD%202006-1515%20Report%206-3-09.pdf.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 5.
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the question of how to protect medical devices and hospital networks
against cyberattacks. HIPAA governs the information security of
hospital networks, but it does not apply to cyberattacks that do not
involve PHI. HIPAA also does not apply to most medical device
manufacturers. FDCA regulates medical devices but not hospital
networks. FDCA’s current device classification scheme reflects the
harm to patients posed by unintentional threats, but not by intentional
cyberattacks. A Class I MDDS may provide a vehicle for a malicious
actor to attack a hospital network, whereas a Class III pacemaker may
not be hooked up to a hospital network at all. While the FDA’s
guidance on cybersecurity is a step in the right direction, it is not
mandatory. Criminal law may eventually deter the malicious actors
behind cyberattacks, and tort law may eventually incentivize
manufacturers and providers to adopt cybersecurity measures. For the
present, however, criminal and tort law are ineffective tools. What is
needed is a regulatory scheme that applies to both medical devices
and hospital networks, and that imposes sensible but mandatory
requirements on manufacturers and hospitals.
HIPAA provides a starting point for a new regulatory scheme.
Congress could expand HIPAA’s information security requirements
to apply to medical device manufacturers. Because HIPAA already
applies to a small number of device manufacturers that sell directly to
Medicare patients,283 it is conceivable that Congress could expand
HIPAA to apply to all device manufacturers. Congress could also
expand HIPAA to apply to any type of cyberattack that harms patient
health or privacy. Limiting HIPAA to attacks involving PHI makes
little sense when cyberattacks could harm patient health without
involving PHI.
Expanding HIPAA would force Congress to address the question
of how HHS and the FDA should work together to regulate
cyberattacks against medical devices and hospital networks. HHS
oversees HIPAA, while the FDA oversees FDCA. In addition, many
different agencies play some role in protecting against cyberattacks.284
The federal Information Security and Privacy Board “finds that
diffusion of responsibility when it comes to cybersecurity of medical

283. See Privacy Basics, supra note 106.
284. Alexander Gaffney, Federal Board: Need for a Single Entity to Assess Cybersecurity
Standards for Devices, REGULATORY FOCUS (July 31, 2013), http://www.raps.org/focusonline/news/news-article-view/article/3871/federal-board-need-for-a-single-entity-to-assesscybersecurity-standards-for-de.aspx.
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devices raises growing concern.”285 Because medical devices are now
an integral part of hospital networks, at the very least FDA and HHS
should develop a joint regulatory scheme. FDA’s draft guidance on
cyberattacks adopts the same general principles as HIPAA—
confidentiality, integrity, and availability286—suggesting that the two
agencies may be able to find common ground. If Congress were to
expand HIPAA or otherwise revisit the regulation of medical devices
and hospital networks to protect against cyberattacks, it might
consider whether one agency should take the lead in this area.
Expanding HIPAA would incentivize medical device
manufacturers and hospitals to protect against cyberattacks. As
described in Part II, the standard of care for cybersecurity is relatively
unclear. Until courts have the opportunity to grapple with several
cases involving cyberattacks, it is unlikely that courts will have the
opportunity to flesh out a standard of care that will incentivize
medical device manufacturers and hospitals to take additional
cybersecurity precautions. In the interim, Congress could expand
HIPAA to impose fines on medical device manufacturers and
healthcare providers if a cyberattack occurs. This is one way to
incentivize rapid and flexible response by industry even where the
standard of care is unclear. This type of regulatory approach is
consistent with that of the Obama administration, which has focused
on setting “performance objectives, rather than specifying the
behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must
adopt.”287
Under HIPAA, there are four tiers of culpability if a patient data
breach occurs. The defendant’s level of culpability determines the
amount of damages. As described in Part II, the first tier covers
violations where “the person did not know (and by exercising
reasonable diligence would not have known) that such person violated
such provision,” with a minimum penalty of $100 per violation and an
annual maximum penalty of $25,000 for repeat violations.288 The
second tier covers violations where “the violation was due to
reasonable cause and not to willful neglect” with a minimum penalty
of $1,000 per violation and an annual maximum penalty of $100,000

285. Id.
286. See CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS, supra note 124.
287. Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
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for repeat violations.289 The third tier covers violations “due to willful
neglect” that are corrected within a certain period of time, with a
minimum penalty of $10,000 per violation and an annual maximum
penalty of $250,000 for repeat violations.290 The fourth and final tier
covers violations that are “due to willful neglect” but are not
corrected in a timely manner, with a minimum penalty of $50,000 per
violation and an annual maximum penalty of $1.5 million.291
Congress could use this sliding scale approach to incentivize
medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers to adopt
cybersecurity measures.292 A sliding scale approach provides at least
two benefits over a fine-grained regulatory approach. First, it forces
medical device manufacturers and healthcare providers to forecast
future threats rather than to rely on FDA or HHS standards that—due
to the length and difficulty of the regulatory process—may only
address current (or even past) threats. This approach incentivizes
industry to rapidly adapt to changing threats or face liability. Second,
a sliding scale approach to damages allows industry to develop the
most cost-effective approach. While a particular regulatory standard
may make sense when promulgated, it may not make sense even a
few months later in the rapidly changing world of software. Forcing
industry to adopt an obsolete standard may be costly and
counterproductive.
Congress or the FDA would have to carefully define the types of
violations that trigger liability for device manufacturers and hospitals.
If every non-negligent software vulnerability led to a fine, the statute
could over-incentivize investment in cybersecurity. It may make
sense to apply the tier one through tier three penalties only in the case
of a cyberattack that leads to large-scale disruption of a network or
physical harm to a patient. Tier four penalties for willful neglect
could apply to security flaws that are serious but remain uncorrected.
The statute or accompanying regulations would have to define what
constitutes a serious security flaw.
Congress would also have to carefully consider which entities
would face penalties under this scheme.
Medical device

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. It may also be possible to simply amend HIPAA to cover cyberattacks and to make
medical device manufacturers liable. However, HIPAA represents a carefully constructed
statutory framework that addresses both privacy and security, and it may be difficult to integrate
liability for cyberattacks without disrupting this framework.
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manufacturers have greater insight into the security flaws of their
individual medical devices, whereas large healthcare providers such
as hospitals have control over the security features of their networks.
The security of individual devices and hospital networks both play an
important role in cybersecurity, although applying the same penalty
scheme to both types of entities may create different incentives for
medical device manufacturers and hospitals. A security flaw in a
medical device may result in a large number of violations for a single
medical device manufacturer. Consequently, the “per violation”
penalties may be too high—or conversely, the maximum annual
penalties may be too low—to ensure the optimal amount of
deterrence.
The same penalty scheme could affect healthcare providers
differently. Penalizing hospitals with thin profit margins may be
counterproductive in some cases, making it more difficult for the
hospital to invest in security or other important aspects of patient care.
Different types of healthcare providers have vastly different resources
and use different types of devices and networks. Focusing on large
providers such as hospitals may be sufficient to protect against
cyberattacks as long as incentives for medical device manufacturers
provide an extra layer of security for devices and networks used by
small providers. Ultimately, calibrating the penalties may be difficult
and would require research into the best way to incentivize industry
without unduly increasing costs or sacrificing patient care.
While Congress has important details to work out before
expanding HIPAA to addresses cyberattacks against both medical
device manufacturers and healthcare providers, this approach could
help protect against cyberattacks while leaving it up to industry to
adopt the most cost-effective solution. Although it is unlikely that
medical device manufacturers or hospitals would support an expanded
HIPAA scheme, this approach could ultimately save manufacturers
and hospitals compliance costs by reducing overlapping HHS and
FDA regulation.
D. Other Approaches
There are other potential approaches to addressing the threat of
cyberattacks on medical devices and hospital networks. One solution
is to promote investment in technology to identify the malicious
actors behind cyberattacks, improving the deterrent power of laws
that impose liability on these actors. Tax credits for medical device
manufacturers and hospitals that invest in cybersecurity measures are
another approach. Negligence liability under the CFAA would also
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create incentives for medical device manufacturers and hospitals,
although the imposition of criminal liability for negligence is harsh.
Other approaches may become viable in the future. As courts begin
to grapple with some of the questions posed by negligence liability in
the context of cyberattacks, courts may develop a common law
framework that renders a statutory approach unnecessary. However,
given the emerging nature of the threats described in this Article,
waiting for the common law to catch up may waste valuable time that
could be spent improving cybersecurity.
CONCLUSION
Congress, regulators, healthcare providers, and medical device
manufacturers should address the growing threat of cyberattacks
against medical devices and hospital networks. The current legal
structure is insufficient to protect patients because it does not
adequately deter the malicious actors behind cyberattacks and because
it does not focus on the role of healthcare providers and medical
device manufacturers in protecting against these attacks. One
solution is industry self-regulation, which has been successful in
addressing other types of challenges in the healthcare industry.
Another solution is to create a more forward-looking FDA regulatory
structure geared towards anticipating and preventing cyberattacks. A
third option is to build on existing laws such as HIPAA to create a
new legislative structure that incentivizes industry to invest in
cybersecurity. As recent cyberattacks on military computers and
financial institutions suggest, cyberattacks are a serious threat. It is
only a matter of time before a malicious actor attacks a medical
device or hospital network and harms patients. While networked
hospitals and wireless medical devices bring new advances in patient
care, they also bring new risks. New approaches are needed to
address these risks.

